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In most wireless sensor networks (WSNs), sensor nodes generate data packets 
and send them to the base station (BS) by multi-hop routing paths because of their 
limited energy and transmission range. The insider packet drop attacks refer to a set of 
attacks where compromised nodes intentionally drop packets. It is challenging to 
accurately detect such attacks because packets may also be dropped due to collision, 
congestion, or other network problems.  
Trust mechanism is a promising approach to identify inside packet drop 
attackers. In such an approach, each node will monitor its neighbor’s packet 
forwarding behavior and use this observation to measure the trustworthiness of its 
neighbors. Once a neighbor’s trust value falls below a threshold, it will be considered 
as an attacker by the monitoring node and excluded from the routing paths so further 
damage to the network will not be made.  
  
In this dissertation, we analyze the limitation of the state-of-the-art trust 
mechanisms and propose several enhancement techniques to better defend against 
insider packet drop attacks in WSNs.  
First, we observe that inside attackers can easily defeat the current trust 
mechanisms and even if they are caught, normally a lot of damage has already been 
made to the network. We believe this is caused by current trust models’ inefficiency in 
distinguishing attacking behaviors and normal network transmission failures. We 
demonstrate that the phenomenon of consecutive packet drops is one fundamental 
difference between attackers and good sensor nodes and build a hybrid trust model 
based on it to improve the detection speed and accuracy of current trust models.  
Second, trust mechanisms give false alarms when they mis-categorize good 
nodes as attackers. Aggressive mechanisms like our hybrid approach designed to catch 
attackers as early as possible normally have high false alarm rate. Removing these 
nodes from routing paths may significantly reduce the performance of the network. 
We propose a novel false alarm detection and recovery mechanism that can recover 
the falsely detected good nodes.  
Next, we show that more intelligent packet drop attackers can launch advanced 
attacks without being detected by introducing a selective forwarding-based denial-of-
service attack that drops only packets from specific victim nodes. We develop 
effective detection and prevention methods against such attack.  
We have implemented all the methods we have proposed and conducted 
extensive simulations with the OPNET network simulator to validate their 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
1.1 Insider Packet Drop Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks 
With the rapid advancement of semiconductor and MEMS (Micro-Electro-
Mechanical Systems) technologies, miniature wireless sensor nodes are becoming more 
powerful and less expensive with better mobility. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are 
widely used in many practical applications including military applications, disaster 
detection and prevention, forest fire protection, habitat monitoring, smart space, etc [19, 
24, 56]. In general, hundreds and thousands of such small inexpensive wireless sensors 
(with a limited transceiver range and battery) are deployed in the field to collect and 
report data to the destination such as the base station (BS) or the fusion center in a 
collaborative multi-hop fashion (multi-hop communication). Here, it is critical that each 
intermediate node (or relay node) will collaborate by forwarding the received packets to 
the next hop neighbor toward the destination. However, since the infrastructure of the 
WSN (both the sensor nodes and their connectivity) may not be trusted, can create 
security concerns and cause damage to the performance of the network. 
Insider threat is one of the most important and challenging security issues in 
WSNs because of its following unique characteristics [7, 15, 27, 57]. First, many WSNs 
are deployed and operated in harsh environments without human involvement. Thus, it is 
possible that adversaries can physically access the wireless sensors and maliciously 
manipulate or compromise them to inside attackers. Second, these inside attackers are 
legitimate members of the network and will not be caught by authentication and 
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authorization mechanisms that are very effective in preventing outside attackers from 
launching attacks such as eavesdropping or packet modifications. Third, due to the multi-
hop packet routing nature of the WSNs, an inside attacker may receive data packets from 
many other sensors, it can disrupt network operations significantly by modifying packet 
information or simply dropping critical packets. Fourth, a wireless sensor has limited 
resources such as memory size, battery power, computing capability, transmission range, 
etc. Therefore, the legacy but expensive security mechanisms such as PKI (Public Key 
Infrastructure) and heavy IDS (Intrusion Detection System) used in traditional wired or 
wireless networks are not suitable for many WSNs. This restriction makes it more 
difficult to defend against inside attackers. Finally, an inside attacker, as a member of the 
WSN, know the security mechanisms being used in the WSN and can learn the 
vulnerabilities of these security mechanisms. It can exploit the discovered vulnerabilities 
to break the security mechanisms or launch sophisticated attacks without being caught.  
Inside attackers can launch various types of attacks actively (such as modification, 
packet drop, or misrouting) or passively (such as eavesdropping). Among these, insider 
packet drop attacks is arguably the easiest to launch, most difficult to detect, yet could 
cause significant network performance degradation, especially when the inside packet 
drop attackers are well-positioned in the network (e.g., close to the BS or at the 
intersection of many routing paths) [2, 7, 10]. Inside packet drop attackers drop packets 
to cause a serious damage to the network either by dropping as many packets as possible 
to significantly degrade network performance or by preventing critical packets from 
being delivered to their destination (Denial-of-Service attack or DoS attack in short). 
Moreover, it is very tricky to defend against insider packet drop attacks because, for a 
 3 
 
particular packet drop, we cannot distinguish whether it is dropped by an attacker or as a 
result of a natural network problem such as collision, interference, noise, fading, 
obstacles, etc [10, 32]. There are several types of packet drop attacks such as blackhole 
attacks, grayhole attacks (a.k.a., selective forwarding attacks), and on-off attacks [1, 7, 
15], which we will elaborate in Chapter 2. Blackhole attackers drop all the received 
packets, on-off attackers drop packets following a rather fixed on and off pattern, and 
grayhole attackers have more complicated and irregular attacking patterns and are the 
more challenging attackers to defend. For this reason, insider packet drop attacks, 
particularly grayhole attacks, have attracted a lot of attention and will be the focus of this 
dissertation. 
Current defending approaches against insider packet drop attacks are either 
avoidance approach or detection approach. The avoidance approaches focus on how to 
deliver the packets successfully with the existence of the attackers. They are not designed 
to catch the attackers. A popular way to achieve this is to use multiple disjoint routing 
paths [7, 48, 58, 59]. In [7], the authors pointed out that k disjoint multipath routing can 
completely defend against selective forwarding attacks when there are no more than k−1 
compromised nodes. Similarly, a multiple data flow scheme using multiple disjoint 
topologies was introduced in [5]. In this scheme, the source node sends its packet through 
one or more topologies randomly chosen from the pre-established multiple topologies to 
avoid packet drop attackers. However, all the avoidance approaches have very high cost 
in terms of network traffic, transmission energy, etc [4]. 
As a representative detection approach, trust mechanism with the notion of trust 
in human society has been proven as a promising approach to identify inside packet drop 
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attackers [1, 6, 12, 15, 22, 25]. In this approach, each sensor node will monitor its 
neighbor’s packet forwarding behavior and use this observation to measure the 
trustworthiness of its neighbors. Once a neighbor’s trust value falls below a pre-
determined threshold, the monitoring node will consider this neighbor as an inside 
attacker and exclude it from the routing paths to avoid further damage to the network. In 
general, the trust mechanism works in the following three stages: 1) node behavior 
monitoring, 2) trust measurement, and 3) insider attack detection. Watchdog [10] that 
uses a sensor’s overhearing ability is a widely used direct monitoring mechanism used in 
the first stage. The other two stages are processed by a trust model such as Beta trust 
model [6] and Entropy trust model [12] using the data collected by the watchdog. A trust-
based routing that combines a trust mechanism with a routing algorithm is used for 
packet routing in a WSN. Many researchers [12, 16, 22, 25, 71, 72, 73] have showed that 
trust-based routing approaches can gracefully mitigate insider packet drop attacks by 
building trusted routing paths to the destination. Moreover, they showed that trust-based 
routing improves packet’s successful delivery rate under insider attacks over routing 
algorithms that do not consider trust.  
Clearly, the effectiveness of these trust-based routing protocols is based on the 
underlying trust model. A good trust model will help the routing algorithm to quickly and 
accurately identify inside attackers and find alternate routes to avoid them. Moreover, 
intelligent inside attackers can adjust their attacking strategy based on the detection 
mechanisms used in the WSN to launch new and more powerful attacks. In this 
dissertation, we will analyze the limitations of the state-of-the-art trust mechanisms and 
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propose several enhancement techniques to better defend against insider packet drop 
attacks in WSNs.  
In the remaining of this introduction chapter, we will highlight the three problems 
we have studied and the main contributions we have made as illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
Detailed discussions are given in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Chapter 2 provides the 
background of the work and surveys current approaches. Chapter 6 summarizes the 
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Figure 1.1: The big picture of this dissertation. 
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1.2 Statement of Problems 
In this dissertation, we study the following three critical problems in the domain 
of trust-based defense against insider packet drop attacks in WSNs.    
1) Fast and accurate detection of inside packet drop attackers 
In the presence of inside packet drop attackers in the network, to minimize the 
damage caused by the attackers, we must detect them as fast as possible once they start 
launching the attacks. In the trust mechanism, a monitoring sensor node will lower the 
trust value of the node it monitors once it observes packet drops and then consider the 
node as an attacker if the trust value becomes lower than a threshold. Meanwhile, a 
normal node (non-attacker) may be observed dropping packets due to network problems 
such as collision, interference, fading, etc. Therefore, it is critical to design a trust model 
with a high attacker detection rate and a low false alarm rate. However, this is not a 
trivial problem because it is hard to distinguish whether a packet drop is caused by 
attacks or by other natural reasons in WSNs. Moreover, a detection method should not be 
computational expensive because it is deployed in a wireless sensor with limited 
resources. This is the reason why current trust models (such as the beta trust model and 
the entropy trust model) used in WSNs are all designed in a simple way to be feasible for 
use on a wireless sensor. For example, the beta trust model needs only two counters and a 
couple of simple operations (addition and division) to measure the trust value of  a node 
(see equation (2.5)), as we will discuss in Chapter 2. However, due to this requirement of 
simplicity, current trust models are unable to quickly detect inside packet drop attackers, 
particularly when they have previously earned high trust value (called traitors). Therefore, 
we propose to study how to design a more efficient trust model to improve the attack 
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detection speed of the current lightweight trust models without significantly increasing 
overhead and false alarms.  
2) Mitigation of false alarms in trust-based routing  
The effectiveness of trust-based routing protocols is based on their underlying 
trust models. A good trust model will help the routing algorithm to quickly and 
accurately identify inside packet drop attackers and find alternate routes to avoid them. 
However, as we have mentioned, it is challenging to distinguish the natural packet drops 
due to network problems from the intentional packet drops by the inside attackers. No 
trust model can detect all the inside attackers (100% detection rate) and not misclassify 
any of the good nodes (0% false alarm rate) [28]. While most of the existing approaches 
focus on how to improve the detection rate without paying much attention on the false 
alarm rate, we propose to study what to do when false alarm happens, specifically when 
the false alarm rate is high. The rationale behind this proposed study is as follows: First, 
natural packet drops do occur in a WSN due to fading, interference, collision, noise, 
congestion, and others [10, 32]. In certain circumstances, such as weather change or 
moving objects, there may be an abnormality in the WSN’s operating environment, 
which will cause non-negligible amount of packet drops and result in false alarms. 
Second, once a node is considered as untrustworthy or as an attacker, the existing trust-
based routing mechanisms will not use this node any more. In the case of a false alarm, 
this will affect the routing performance. It also shortens the network lifetime as it is well-
known that network’s lifetime is closely correlated to the time when the first node in the 
network goes down [31, 39, 40]. Therefore, the proposed study on how to mitigate false 
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alarms will be complementary to and have significant impact on the performance of any 
trust-based routing algorithm.  
3) Defense against intelligent insider packet drop attacks  
We consider that an intelligent packet drop attacker can estimate its trust value and 
exploit its internal knowledge about the network and the trust mechanism including the 
trust threshold. In addition, such an attacker can use these estimates to adjust its packet 
drop rate without being detected by the network’s trust mechanism. For example, when its 
estimates that its trust value is close to the trust threshold, the attacker can temporarily 
stop dropping the victim node’s packets and start forwarding all the packets, including the 
victim node’s,  in order to increase its trust value and earn trust from its neighbors and the 
victim node. Once the attacker earns high trust value at the victim node again, it can repeat 
the packet drop attacks against the victim node again. In this case, trust mechanism will 
not be able to detect this intelligent packet drop attacker. We introduce such an intelligent 
packet drop attack, so called selective forwarding-based denial-of-service (DoS) attack, 
where the attacker drops only some source sensor nodes’ data packets of interest in order 
to prevent their packets from reaching the BS and thus lead to denial of service against 
the physical area monitored by those sensor nodes. As a motivation for the importance of 
studying selective forwarding-based DoS attacks, we consider a WSN deployed in a 
territory for intruder detection. With the help of insiders that perform the selective 
forwarding-based DoS attack, an outside intruder will be able to enter the territory from 
the area monitored by victim nodes (to the selective forwarding-based DoS attacks) 
without being noticed by the BS, as shown in Figure 1.2. We propose to study how to 
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improve the existing trust mechanisms so that they can effectively defend against the 















(b) When there are inside packet drop attackers (red nodes) 
 
Figure 1.2: A motivational example of insider packet drop attacks. In (a), outside intruders 
(tanks) are detected by the base station. In (b), two inside packet drop attackers (red nodes) are 
dropping critical packets to protect outside intruders.   
 
1.3 Key Contributions 
In this dissertation, we study the above important problems in the domain of trust-
based defense against insider packet drop attacks and make the following key 
contributions:  
1) We demonstrate that the phenomenon of consecutive packet drops is one 
fundamental difference between attackers and good sensor nodes and build a hybrid 
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trust model based on it to improve the detection speed and accuracy of current trust 
models: In Chapter 3, based on our analysis of goals of insider packet drop attacks and 
existing packet drop attack models, we propose that the occurrence of consecutive drops 
is a promising feature for fast and accurate detection of inside packet drop attackers. 
When an inside packet drop attacker is dropping packets consecutively, we can 
probabilistically measure the degree of abnormality (or maliciousness) of the node, and 
penalize the node based on it. However, existing trust models, such as the beta trust 
model and entropy trust model, do not consider the consecutive drops for trust evaluation. 
We design a lightweight new trust model based on the consecutive drops, and build a 
hybrid trust model that can adaptively choose between this new trust model and the beta 
trust model according to the number of consecutive drops. Extensive simulations based 
on the widely used commercial network simulator OPNET Wireless Modeler [21] show 
that our hybrid trust model outperforms the beta trust model in terms of important 
network performance parameters, such as attack detection speed, attack detection 
accuracy, routing reliability, and energy-efficiency. Specifically, the results show that our 
hybrid trust model can always detect various inside packet drop attackers faster than the 
beta trust model. In addition, due to the fast attack detection capability based the 
consecutive drops, a geographic routing protocol with our hybrid trust model (Hybrid 
GRP) can deliver approximately 92% of data packets from source nodes to the BS 
successfully even when 15% of nodes in the network are grayhole attackers that 
randomly drop 30% of packets while the geographic routing (Pure GRP) and the 
geographic routing protocol with the beta trust model (Beta GRP) can deliver only 71% 
and 78% of packets to the BS, respectively. Moreover, our Hybrid GRP consumes less 
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energy to send a packet to the BS than the Pure GRP and the Beta GRP. 
2) We devise a false alarm detection and recovery mechanism (FADER) that 
mitigates false alarms by re-evaluating the trustworthiness of the falsely detected good 
nodes and re-determining whether they are attackers: As described in Chapter 4, our 
main idea to treat false alarms in a trust-based routing is to give these nodes a second 
chance such that their neighbors can continue to monitor their behavior and evaluate their 
trustworthiness. If their neighbors are convinced that false alarm has occurred, these 
nodes will be re-considered as good nodes and play their normal role in routing. 
However, if these nodes are confirmed to be inside attackers, they will be eliminated 
from the routing table just like the current trust-based routing algorithms. We call this 
mechanism False Alarm DEtection and Recovery, or FADER in short. The key 
contribution in FADER is that it allows a node to detect and correct (by recovery) its false 
alarm. By doing so, we can improve the performance of the trust-based routing protocol 
in terms of many metrics, such as the network lifetime, the packet delivery rate, and 
many routing performance measures. We have conducted extensive OPNET simulations 
and the results confirm these claimed advantages of our proposed FADER approach over 
a representative trust-based routing algorithm. The results show that FADER is able to 
recover 60−70% of the false alarms without recovering any of the attackers in the 
presence of multiple attackers in lossy WSNs. In addition, with the false alarm detection 
and recovery feature, FADER can improve the network lifetime by 18.7−82.9% of Beta 
GRP and reduce the average hops per path by 7.5−16.7% of Beta GRP. 
3) We demonstrate how intelligent inside packet drop attackers can successfully 
launch denial-of-service attacks against many sensor nodes without being detected by 
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current trust models (called the selective forwarding-based DoS attack) and propose 
effective detection and prevention methods against such attack: In Chapter 5, we first 
describe a simple selective forwarding-based DoS attack and show that the popular trust-
based approaches (such as the beta trust model and the entropy trust model) for inside 
attacker detection fail to detect such an attack. We also analyze the potential damage this 
attack can cause to the network. We then propose a source-level trust evaluation scheme 
to enhance the beta and entropy trust mechanisms for effective detection of the selective 
forwarding-based DoS attackers. Once the attacker is identified, we propose two 
avoidance strategies to re-route the victim’s packets so they can reach the BS. We 
conduct extensive OPNET simulations to validate our claims and demonstrate the 
advantages of our proposed approaches. The results show that the existing trust models 
(the beta trust model and the entropy trust model) with our detection and avoidance 
approaches with small energy and memory overhead can detect selective forwarding DoS 
attackers and avoid them when the same trust models without our methods failed to 
detect the attackers. In addition, as a complementary defensive mechanism to our 
detection and avoidance methods, we also introduce a prevention routing algorithm to 
proactively prevent the selective forwarding-based DoS attacks. The key idea of our 
prevention method is to limit the number of source nodes from which a node receives 
packets through the same monitoring node. As a result, our prevention method forces the 
attacker to make a choice: attack and being caught or not attack. The OPNET simulation 
results show that the beta trust model with our prevention method successfully defend 
against a selective forwarding-based DoS attacker while the beta trust model fails in 




Background and Related Work 
 
2.1 Packet Forwarding Procedure in WSNs  
To understand the behaviors of inside packet drop attackers, we briefly explain 
how a wireless sensor node forwards its data packet to another node toward the BS. We 
consider the scenario that a node A delivers its own packet (A is a source node) or a 
received packet from other nodes (A is a relay node) to the base station (BS) in a WSN. 
The packet forwarding procedure in a WSN follows CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple 
Access with Collision Avoidance), which is a wireless channel access method used in 
wireless networks where A node can transmit its packet only when the channel is idle [41, 
52, 54]. That is, if another node is transmitting on the channel within its wireless range 
(channel is busy), the node needs to wait for a random period of time (called random 
back off time). 
When node A has a packet to forward toward the BS, which is stored in its packet 
forwarding queue QF, A forwards the packet toward the BS according to the packet 
forwarding procedure as shown in Figure 2.1. The routing path from A to BS is 
constructed following some routing algorithm that allows multi-hop communication for 
energy efficiency. For each intermediate node i in the routing path, let NSi be its 
Neighbor Set consisting of all its neighbor nodes and FSi (Forwarding Set) be the set of 
candidate nodes which the packet may be forwarded to. Apparently, FS is a subset of NS. 
To forward packets to BS, node A first chooses a node B from its FSA as the next hop and 
sends the packet to B. Once the next hop node is determined, A forwards its packet to B 
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when the channel is idle. In the case when B receives the packet, it will send an 
acknowledgement message (ACK) back to A, and then forward the packet to the next 
node in its FSA toward the BS. If A does not get the ACK message from B, A retransmits 
the packet up to a pre-determined number of times (MaxR), seven for example; this may 
happen due to network problems (such as collision) or B’s malicious denial. If A does not 
get the ACK message from B even after the maximum retransmissions MaxR, A discards 
the packet and starts forwarding a next packet in its packet forwarding queue QF.  
 
Is the channel idle?
Select a next hop node based 
on the routing algorithm





R = R + 1
R > MaxR?
Discard the packet




Pop a packet in the packet 
forwarding queue QF
* R: Num. of Retransmissions









Figure 2.1: Simplified packet forwarding procedure in a WSN. 
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If B is an insider packet drop attacker, B can simply drop A’s packet as follows: 
(a) B denies receiving A’s packet, (b) B receives A’s packet, sends ACK back to A, but 
drops the packet. Both cases will appear to A as natural packet drops due to network 
problems such as collision, noise, etc. In addition, a retransmission mechanism using 
ACK cannot defend against B’s malicious packet drops. Therefore, we need a special 
countermeasure to defend against B’s malicious packet drop. As we will explain later, if 
we have a trust mechanism with watchdog, the trust mechanism in A will evaluate the 
trustworthiness of B based on B’s behavioral history to defend against (a) and the direct 
monitoring mechanism (such as watchdog) in A will monitor B’s packet forwarding 
behavior to check whether or not B forwards A’s packet indeed to defend against (b).  
 
2.2 Insider Packet Drop Attacks in WSNs  
In WSNs, sensor nodes will generate data packets and send them to the base 
station (BS) in a multi-hop collaborative fashion due to their limited energy and 
transmission range. While being routed to the BS, data packets may be lost from 
collision, congestion, fading, obstacles, or other network problems. The so-called insider 
packet drop attacks refer to a set of attacks where compromised nodes intentionally drop 
packets [2]. This type of attack has become a serious security threat in WSNs and can 
cause a serious damage to the network [2, 7, 10]. First, such attackers disguise their 
malicious behavior behind the aforementioned natural packet loss phenomenon. As a 
result, it is very difficult to detect them accurately as attackers without false alarms. 
Second, well-positioned attackers can be on the routing path of many nodes and thus 
receive many data packets. Thus, they can drop many packets to degrade network 
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performance or selectively drop critical packets to prevent them from being delivered to 
their destination (DoS attack). Third, attackers can easily launch these attacks by simply 
dropping packets without wasting their resources such as energy and memory.  
There are several types of packet drop attacks such as blackhole attacks, on-off 
attacks, and grayhole attacks as described as follows [1, 7, 15].  
1) Blackhole attacks: This attacker will drop all the received packets. This attack 
is the simplest type of packet drop attack, but causes the most serious damage to the 
network among all types of packet drop attacks. However, the monitoring neighbors can 
easily capture this attacker, since it consistently drops all their packets.    
2) On-off attacks: This attacker will drop all the received packets when it is in 
attacking mode, and forward all the received packets when the attack is off. It repeats this 
drop-forward pattern periodically. For example, the attacker drops all received packets 
during the first 100 seconds (attack on), then forwards all received packets for the next 
100 seconds (attack off), and repeats this drop-forward pattern periodically. This attacker 
can appear suspicious to its monitoring neighbors during its attack period when it acts 
like blackhole attacker and thus can be detected easily when the attack on period is long 
or the on-off pattern is discovered.  
3) Grayhole attacks (a.k.a., selective forwarding attacks): This attacker will drop 
some of the received packets, either randomly or selectively. For example, each time the 
attacker receives a packet, it may decide whether to drop it according to a predetermined 
attack rate (or drop rate). Another example is that the attacker may only drop packets of 
specific type or generated by a specific source node.  
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As described above, it is easy to catch blackhole attackers and there is also some 
relatively effective means to detect on-off attackers. The grayhole attackers remain as the 
most difficult to detect because most of the time their behaviors are very similar to those 
of the normal nodes. Moreover, packet drop attacks have evolved to drop packets 
intelligently by exploiting internal knowledge about network and security mechanisms to 
avoid being detected [15]. 
 
2.3 Defending Approaches against Insider Packet Drop Attacks  
Current defending approaches against insider packet drop attacks are either 
avoidance approach or detection approach.  
 
2.3.1 Avoidance Approach 
The avoidance approaches focus on how to deliver the packets successfully with 
the existence of the attackers. A popular way to achieve this is to use multipath routing 
paths [7, 48, 58, 59]. In [7], the authors pointed out that k disjoint multipath routing can 
completely defend against selective forwarding attacks with no more than k-1 
compromised nodes. However, the multipath routing approach has a couple of drawbacks 
[4]. First, communication overhead increases significantly as the number of paths 
increases, and thus it may lead to more collision and interference. As a result, the packet 
delivery performance of a routing can be dramatically degraded. Second, since this 
approach cannot catch and discard the attackers, this approach can be compromised if an 
adversary locates at least one attacker in each routing path. Similarly, a multiple data flow 
scheme using multiple disjoint topologies was introduced in [5]. In this scheme, a sending 
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node sends its packets through one or more randomly chosen topologies among the pre-
established multiple topologies to mitigate selective forwarding attacks.  
 
2.3.2 Detection Approach 
The detection approaches focus on how to quickly and accurately detect the 
attackers. In general, the attack detection is conducted in two steps: 1) data collection and 
2) evaluation and detection. Collected data (step 1) is used to evaluate a node and 
determine whether it is an attacker or not (step 2).  
First, data collection mechanisms can be classified into either direct monitoring 
mechanisms or indirect monitoring mechanisms. Watchdog [10] is the most popular 
direct monitoring mechanism by which each evaluating sensor node can observe other 
nodes’ packet transmission behavior. Since it manages only two simple counters (the 
number of successes and the number of failures), it is well suited to a wireless sensor 
with a limited memory. This approach has a limitation such that an evaluating node 
cannot monitor nodes that are out of its overhearing range. To overcome this limitation, 
the neighbor-based monitoring approaches are introduced as follows. Hai and Huh [17] 
present a neighbor-based monitoring and detection mechanism using two-hop neighbor 
knowledge where each exchanges its one-hop neighbors’ packet forwarding behavior 
periodically. In the multi-hop acknowledgement scheme [4], each node in the forwarding 
path is responsible for detecting attackers. Specifically, some randomly chosen nodes 
(called ACK nodes) will report ACKs back to the source node (hop by hop) using the 
same but reversed routing path when they receive a packet. However, these approaches 
assume that neighbors providing such information are trustful. As a result, these 
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approaches are vulnerable to false information (e.g., false accusation or bad mouthing) 
provided by malicious neighbors [10, 15, 23, 42, 43, 44]. Moreover, these approaches 
introduce network overhead due to periodic information exchange between nodes 
compared to the direct monitoring approach.  
Second, various evaluation and detection approaches are introduced as follows.  
The trust mechanisms with the notion of trust in human society have been a 
promising solution to defend against insider packet drop attacks [1, 6, 12, 15, 22, 25]. A 
trust model such as the beta trust model, which is a component of trust mechanism, 
quantitatively measures the trustworthy of nodes based on the data collected by a 
monitoring mechanism described above and then classifies a node as either trustworthy or 
untrustworthy according to a predefined threshold. The evaluating node will discard 
untrustworthy nodes. The attack detection performance such as detection speed or 
detection accuracy depends on a trust model. It is critical that a trust model should be 
lightweight in order to be suitable for a wireless sensor. 
On the other hand, in the incentive-based approach [61, 62], nodes are given 
virtual credits initially and they need to pay a certain amount of credits to forward their 
packets toward the destination. To earn credits, a node must forward other nodes’ packets 
cooperatively. This approach forces a node to be collaborative to be participating in 
packet forwarding activities. In addition, sophisticated intrusion detection approaches 
based on data mining technique are introduced for WSNs [63, 64]. While these 
approaches have high detection accuracy, these approaches introduce high complexity 
and thus do not fit a small, inexpensive wireless sensor with limited resources [27].    
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In this dissertation, we focus on advancing the state-of-the-art trust mechanisms 
with a direct monitoring mechanism watchdog for WSNs.  
 
2.4 Watchdog 
Marti et al [10] introduced a monitoring mechanism known as watchdog to 
identify misbehaving nodes in wireless ad hoc networks. In their approach, each sensor 
node has its own watchdog that monitors and records its one hop neighbors’ behaviors 
such as packet transmission. When a sending node S sends a packet to its neighbor node 
T, the watchdog in S verifies whether T forwards the packet toward the BS or not by 
using the sensor’s overhearing ability within its transceiver range.  
In this mechanism, S stores all recently sent packets in its buffer, and compares 
each packet with the overheard packet to see whether there is a match. If yes, it means 
that the packet is forwarded by T and S will remove the packet from the buffer. If a 
packet remains in the buffer for a period longer than a pre-determined time, the watchdog 
considers that T fails to forward the packet and will increase its failure tally for T. If a 
neighbor’s failure tally exceeds a certain threshold, T will be considered as a misbehaving 
node by S. Watchdog works similarly with trust mechanism in that trust model evaluates 
each sensor’s trustworthiness based on the past behaviors in much sophisticated ways.  
 Although watchdog is a popular mechanism for direct neighbor monitoring, 
unfortunately it cannot completely monitor its neighbor’s packet forwarding behaviors. In 
[10], Marti et al pointed out that watchdog is limited by not being able to detect a 
misbehaving node in the presence of the following cases. We briefly examine each case 





Figure 2.2: A routing path S→A→B→C→BS. 
1) Ambiguous collision: Consider the situation that A forwards a packet to B, and 
then starts to overhear whether B will forward the packet to C. However, when B 
forwards to C, A may not overhear this transmission if other neighbors (such as S) send 
packets to A at the same time. This collision may mislead A to conclude that B is 
malicious, which may not be correct.   
2) Receiver collision: Similar to the above case, a collision may also occur at the 
receiver side C resulting in C not receiving the packet correctly. A can only overhear that 
B has forwarded the packet, but A cannot tell whether C has received. When this happens, 
(malicious) node B can intentionally skip retransmissions or (malicious) node C can 
generate collision on purpose to avoid receiving the packet.  
3) Limited transmission power: If B adjusts its transmission power such that A 
can overhear but C cannot receive, B can not only drop packets but also increase its 
trustworthiness (to node A). In geographic routings where every node knows the 
positions of itself and its neighbors, B can easily launch this attack as follows. B selects a 
node C from its FS such that dist (B, C) > dist (B, A) where dist (i, j) is a distance 
between nodes i and j, and then transmits its packet by maliciously adjusting power such 
that the packet can reach A but cannot reach C.  
4) False misbehavior: This case happens when a malicious node intentionally 
















packets although B is not. Then, A’s neighbor such as node S, which cannot directly 
communicate (and thus monitor) B, will consider B malicious.  
5) Collusion: Multiple colluding attackers can launch more sophisticated attacks. 
For example, two malicious colluding nodes A and B can completely deceive S if A 
forwards all packets from S to B, but B drops all the packets. Since S cannot overhear B’s 
drops, S will not consider A and B malicious.  
6) Partial dropping: Instead of dropping all packets, B can drop only some 
packets such that the failure tally will not exceed the detection threshold of A’s watchdog. 
This is similar to the grayhole attacks. 
Despite its many known limitations, the watchdog has been widely used as a 
direct monitoring mechanism that enables a sender to monitor a receiver’s packet 
forwarding behavior to its packets by resolving the limitations of the ACK mechanism, as 
described in Section 2.1. In this dissertation, to avoid any confusion, we consider that 
watchdog is a component in the trust mechanism and it is responsible for node behavior 
monitoring. The limitations of watchdog will be the limitations of trust mechanisms. 
Although we do not enhance all limitations of watchdog introduced above in this 
dissertation, we study how to reduce the damage caused by the inside packet drop 
attackers in the presence of current trust mechanisms with the watchdog. 
 
2.5 Trust mechanism 
2.5.1 Notion of trust 
Gambetta built a framework where trust can be measured mathematically by 
defining trust as the subjective probability by which one individual expects that another 
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individual will perform a given action on which its welfare depends [46]. In computer 
networks, Sun et al [12, 23] introduced trust as a belief -- one entity believes that the 
other entity will act in a certain way. Yu et al [15] defined trust as a subjective opinion in 
the reliability of other entities or functions, including veracity of data, connectivity of 
path, processing capability of node, and availability of service, etc.  
 
2.5.2 Three Working Stages of Trust Mechanism 
A trust mechanism defines a trust value (or trustworthiness) for each sensor node, 
and how each node measures the trustworthiness of its neighbors. It detects insider packet 
drop attacks in the three stages: neighbor behavior monitoring, trust measurement, and 
attacker detection. We now elaborate each of these stages.  
1) Neighbor behavior monitoring: Each node monitors and records its neighbors’ 
behaviors such as packet forwarding. Watchdog is a popular monitoring mechanism used 
in this stage. The confidence of the trustworthiness evaluation depends on how much data 
a sensor collects and how reliable such data are. That is, if the collected data are not 
trustful, the entire trust mechanism cannot be trustful, either.   
2) Trust measurement: Trust model defines how to measure the trustworthiness of 
a sensor node based on the data collected in the previous stage. Yu et al [15] introduced 
several representative approaches to build the trust model, which include Bayesian 
approach, Entropy approach, Fuzzy approach, etc. The trust value of a node may be 
different when we use different trust models. For example, when a node is observed to 
forward the packet s times and drops the packet f times, the beta trust model [6] will 
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Meanwhile, entropy trust model [12] will assign trust value T (–1 ≤ T ≤ 1) to this 
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We will explain trust models in detail in Section 2.5.3.  
 
3) Attack detection: By comparing the measured trust value with a pre-determined 
threshold ΘT, a node can decide whether its neighbor is trustworthy. If the neighbor’s trust 
value is less than ΘT, it will be considered as an inside packet drop attacker and thus it will 
be discarded by the evaluating node. Depending on the network’s trust mechanism, the 
detection of inside packet drop attackers may or may not be broadcast to the rest of the 
nodes in the network. In our dissertation, we assume that the decision will not be 
broadcast for simplicity.  
 
2.5.3 Trust Models 
We describe in detail two representative trust models based on Bayesian and 
Entropy approaches which we are going to compare with our proposed trust model. In 
addition, we briefly introduce a couple of other approaches to model trust. 
 1) Beta trust model based on Bayesian approach 
Josang [6] proposed a Bayesian approach-based beta trust model, which has since 
been widely used in most computer networks due to its simplicity. The beta trust model is 
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designed by using a mathematical fact [3] that the posterior probability p of a binary 


























































 duuu , gamma function Γ (n) = 
(n-1)! for a positive integer n, 0 ≤  p ≤ 1, α > 0, β > 0, and the following two restrictions: 































































When we want to evaluate an entity’s trust based on observations of whether the 
entity performs an action successfully or not, let s and f the number of successes and 
failures, respectively. Beta trust model uses the expectation of p with α = s+1 and   β = 












fspfETBeta  (2.5) 
For trust evaluation, the beta trust model just needs to keep s and f of an entity, 
and use the simple equation (2.5) at a certain time t. This simplicity makes the beta trust 
model very suitable for WSNs, and many researchers have used this model as a part of 
their trust mechanisms or trust-based applications [23, 29, 30, 44, 53, 70].  
2) Entropy trust model based on Information Theory  
Sun et al [12] proposed a unique trust model using the notion of entropy for 
wireless mobile ad hoc network, where they measure the uncertainty in belief between 
two entities, subject and object. In information theory, entropy is a measure for the 
uncertainty of a random variable [51]. Given a binary random variable X whose value is 
1 with probability p, entropy H(X) is defined as 
 ).()1(log)1(log)( 22 pHppppXH
def
  (2.6) 
  
 
Figure.2.3: Entropy function H(p). H(0) = H(1) = 0 and H(0.5) = 1. 
As Figure 2.3 shows, entropy H(X) reaches its maximum at p = 0.5, when the 
value of X is equally likely to be 0 or 1, exhibiting the largest uncertainty; and there is no 














TEntr  (2.7) 
where the value of p is obtained using the same beta distribution function as that 
in the beta trust model. In this trust model, trust value reaches to its maximum (that is, 1) 
when p = 1 (maximum uncertainty) and to its minimum (that is, -1) when p = 0 
(maximum uncertainty); trust value becomes 0 when p = 0.5 (minimum uncertainty). 
Therefore, we can consider entropy trust model as a combination of Bayesian and 
Entropy approaches.  
Note that in (2.5), the trust value is between 0 and 1. But the trust value in (2.7) is 








  (2.8) 
3) Other approaches 
Similar to the entropy-based approach, Fuzzy-based approaches have been 
introduced to WSNs to handle the uncertainty in trust management [15, 65]. In these 
approaches, based on the predefined set of rules and obtained data about a node, a fuzzy 
inference engine simulates humans’ decision-making processes to determine the 
trustworthiness of a given node. However, these approaches have high memory and 
computation cost and may not be appropriate for WSNs applications.  
Game theory-based approaches have also been introduced in wireless ad hoc 
networks to discard uncooperative nodes and achieve cooperation among nodes in the 
network [15, 66]. Jaramillo et al [66] presented a reputation mechanism evaluating the 
trustworthiness of nodes interacting based on a Prisoner’s dilemma model. However, Yu 
et al [15] pointed out that game theory is not a suitable approach for WSNs because the 
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game theory is not a predictable tool for nodes’ behaviors, and moreover the characteristic 
of one-way transmission in general WSNs does not satisfy the bidirectional behaviors, 
which is a requirement for game theory. 
 
2.6 Trust-based Routing (Trust-aware Routing) 
Here we explain how the trust-based routing defends against insider packet drop 
attacks by using the Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) [8], which is a 
representative geographic routing used in wireless ad hoc and sensor networks [22, 67, 
68], and a simple trust-based routing based on the GPSR.  
 
2.6.1 Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) 
1) Greedy forwarding 
 
Figure 2.4: Greedy forwarding and perimeter forwarding in the GPSR. Greedy forwarding finds a 
neighbor closest to the BS. When greedy forwarding fails in finding such a neighbor (e.g., when 




The sending node S forwards a packet to a node nearest to the destination using 
its one-hop neighbors’ geographic information. Let d(ni, nj) denote the Euclidean distance 
between two nodes ni and nj. Then, S selects node n* as the next hop where n* has the 
minimum distance d(n*, D) to destination D among S and all its neighbors. For example, 
in the small WSN shown in Figure 2.4, node 16 will choose node 22 as the next hop 
because node 22 is closer to the destination node 29 (called base station) than any of 16’s 
other neighbors (nodes 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, and 21) and node 16 itself. However, this 
greedy forwarding may fail when S becomes the local optimal where S has no neighbors 
closer to the destination than S itself. Node 22 in Figure 2.4 is one of such local optimal. 
In this case, we say that S meets a void (or a hole) as shown in the shaded region in 
Figure 2.4. When this occurs, a perimeter forwarding method below will be used to find 
an alternative node to the destination.   
2) Perimeter forwarding (when greedy forwarding failed) 
When the sending node S meets a void, it can forward the packet to a node on the 
perimeter of a planarized graph [8], such as Relative Neighborhood Graph (RNG) or 
Gabriel Graph (GG), based on the right hand rule to the clockwise direction. Perimeter is 
a sequence of edges traversed following the right-hand rule. Planar graph is a graph 
where no two edges cross and it can be used to enforce the right hand rule. The 
complexity of generating RNG or GG takes O(deg
2
) time at each node where deg is the 
node’s degree in the radio graph. For example, in Figure 2.4, nodes 22, 18, and 24 form a 
planarized graph and node 18 along the perimeter can be selected to receive the messages 




2.6.2 Trust-based GPSR 
In order to enhance the security and reliability of routing solutions in the network, 
the notion of trust has been considered. The dotted line 16 → M22 → 28 → BS29 in 
Figure 2.5 is the routing path by GPSR. When nodes M22 and M23 become inside packet 
drop attackers and start performing blackhole attack, all their received packets will be 
dropped. Using a monitoring mechanism such as watchdog, their neighbors will notice 
the drop of the packets and reduce the trust value of nodes M22 and M23. When their 
trust value goes below a pre-defined threshold ΘT, a trust-based GPSR as simple as 
forwarding only to node whose trust value is above the threshold ΘT will avoid nodes 





Figure 2.5: GPSR (Dotted lines) and Trust-based GPSR (Solid lines). In the presence of inside 
packet drop attackers (nodes M22 and M23), the trust-based GPSR finds a trustful routing path 




Many researchers [12, 16, 22, 25, 71, 72, 73] have showed that trust-based routing 
approaches can gracefully mitigate insider packet drop attacks by building trusted paths 
to the destination. Moreover, they showed that trust-based routing improves the packet’s 
successful delivery rate under insider packet drop attacks over routing algorithms that do 
not consider trust. Clearly, the effectiveness of these trust-based routing protocols is 
based on the underlying trust model. A good trust model will help the routing algorithm 
to quickly and accurately identify insider packet drop attackers and find alternate routes 
to avoid them. 
In this dissertation, we will use a geographic routing protocol that is similar with 




Hybrid Trust Model against Insider Packet Drop Attacks 
 
3.1 Overview  
Inside attackers are also legitimate members of the network and they will know 
the trust mechanism being used. As we will elaborate later, it is trivial for attackers to 
launch insider packet drop attacks without being detected by the existing trust 
mechanisms. Meanwhile, inside attackers can continue to drop packets and cause damage 
to the network performance before they are detected and eliminated from the network. 
Therefore, quick and accurate detection of inside packet drop attackers is critical to 
minimize the damage to the network, especially for networks that carry out mission-
critical applications Clearly, any characteristics that can distinguish inside packet drop 
attackers from other normal nodes will help in evaluating a node’s trustworthiness and 
thus improves the detection effectiveness of trust mechanisms. 
In this chapter, we propose consecutive packet drops as one of such characteristics 
because of the following three reasons. First, in many applications, inside packet drop 
attackers have to drop packets consecutively to achieve their goal and this has been 
demonstrated in the previous studies [1, 15, 25]. Second, a large number of consecutive 
drops are unlikely to happen naturally at a normal node. Third, when a normal node drops 
packets consecutively due to network problem, although it is not an attacker, it may be 
advantageous to eliminate such node from the routing paths to improve network 
performance. Basically, the first two reasons indicate that consecutive packet drops can 
distinguish the behavior between attackers and normal nodes; the last reason argues that a 
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false alarm (that is, misclassifying a normal node as an attacker) may not cause much 
damage to the network performance. 
Current trust models, including the popular Beta trust model [6] and Entropy trust 
model [12], only consider the total number of packet drops and do not address the 
distribution of these drops. As we will show later in this chapter, such models cannot be 
effective in detecting inside attackers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to build trust models based on packet dropping properties other than the total 
number. Our trust model takes consecutive packet drops into consideration and can be 
seamlessly integrated into existing models.  
To show that evaluating the trust value of a node based on its consecutive packet 
drops can effectively improve the detection speed and accuracy, we propose a new trust 
model based on the concept of consecutive drops, and then build a hybrid trust model that 
can adaptively choose between this new trust model and an existing trust model. We 
conduct extensive simulations using a commercially available network simulator, OPNET 
Modeler [21], to demonstrate that our model outperforms the beta trust model for all 
types of inside packet drop attacks not only in terms of detection speed and accuracy as it 
is designed for, but also in terms of other important network performance metrics such as 
packet delivery rate, routing reliability, and energy-efficiency.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we give the 
motivation for considering consecutive packet drops in evaluating trust in order to 
quickly and accurately detect inside packet drop attackers. In Section 3.3, we elaborate 
our hybrid trust model based on consecutive drops. In Section 3.4, we evaluate the 
performance of our model. Finally, we summarize in Section 3.5. 
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3.2 Problem Description 
3.2.1 Consecutive Packet Drops 
Assuming that inside packet drop attackers reside in the network, detecting them 
as soon as possible (early detection) is critical to minimize the damage they may cause to 
the network, because undetected attackers repeatedly drop packets and thus degrade the 
network performance. We propose to use consecutive drops (or consecutive failures) for 
the early detection of inside packet drop attackers. Evaluating trust based on consecutive 
drops improves the early detection ability of a trust model because of the following two 
reasons. 
First, an inside packet drop attacker drops packets consecutively to cause serious 
damage to the network. In this dissertation, we do not consider an attacker that cannot 
cause significant damage to the network. According to most known packet drop attack 
models, the attacker achieves this goal either by dropping as many packets as possible to 
significantly degrade the packet delivery performance or by preventing some critical data 
packets from reaching the destination (DoS attack) [11, 14, 49]. To do so, an attacker will 
generate frequent or long consecutive drops. If an attacker does not drop packets 
consecutively, the maximum damage that it can cause will be very limited. For example, 
in the former case, an attacker cannot drop more than 50% of packets that it receives 
without dropping packets consecutively. Meanwhile, the attacker can drop up to 100% of 
receive packets if it drops packets consecutively. Thus, if we consider consecutive drops 
in evaluating the trustworthiness of such attackers, we can better defend against them. 
For the latter case, consider a WSN deployed in a territory for intruder detection. With the 
help of insiders that perform the DoS attack, an intruder will be able to enter the territory 
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from the area monitored by victim nodes. If a malicious insider does not consecutively 
drop critical data packets with the information of the intruder, some of the critical packets 
will reach the BS, and thus the BS will detect the intruder. In this intruder detection 
problem, consecutive drops are more critical than the former case (network performance 
degradation). Similar practical examples can be found in many WSN applications such as 
fire detection, enemy tracking, battlefield surveillance, and disaster prevention [19, 24].  
Second, a large number of consecutive drops are unlikely to happen at a normally 
functioning node in the network. We can probabilistically measure the degree of 
abnormality of a node generating consecutive drops based on the number of consecutive 
drops. That is, as the size of consecutive drops n grows, the belief that the node 
generating the n consecutive drops is an abnormal node such as a packet drop attacker or 
a faulty node also grows. Let P[f] be the probability that a packet is dropped at a normally 
functioning node. Then, the probability that a packet is forwarded by the node 
successfully will be P[s] = 1 – P[f]. If we observe 10 consecutive drops at the node, then 
the probability that the 10 drops occur consecutively is P[f]
10
. When we assume P[f] < 
P[s] in a well-designed WSN, even if P[f] is 0.5, P[f]
10  
≈ 0.000977, which means that it is 
very unlikely that 10 consecutive drops are happening. As n grows, the probability that 
the n consecutive drops happen (P[f]
n
) decreases exponentially, and the probability that 
the n consecutive drops would not happen (1 - P[f]
n
) also grows. If n > m > 0, we believe 
that n consecutive drops are more abnormal and suspicious to inside packet drop attacks 
than m consecutive drops. Based on this reasoning, we will show how we can penalize a 
node based on the number of consecutive drops in Section 3.3. 
Meanwhile, using consecutive drops for detecting packet drop attack may 
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generate a false alarm. In practice, a node (non-attacker) may also drop many packets 
consecutively due to fading or obstacles. Detecting such node as an attacker is a false 
alarm. However, if a node (non-attacker) generates a large number of consecutive drops, 
it is not functioning normally, and we should consider such node untrustworthy to ensure 
the quality of packet delivery performance of a routing. In fact, we show that avoiding 
such problematic nodes quickly reduces the packet drop rate of a routing in Section 3.4.  
 
3.2.2 Existing Trust Models and Consecutive Drops  
In this section, we use an example to show what an inside packet drop attacker 
can do against the existing trust models that do not consider consecutive drops.  
Consider the two observations that contain 10 successes and 10 failures such as 
ffssfsfsfsfffsssfsfs and ssssssssssffffffffff. Both trust models will treat them equally 
although the latter sequence looks more suspicious to the insider packet drop attack due 
to the last 10 consecutive drops according to the above reasoning. This is also supported 
by a practical assumption that inside attackers start attacks after they develop high trust 
(e.g., the first 10 successes in the latter observation) to avoid being easily detected by the 
trust mechanism [20].   
We now show how the beta and entropy trust models may fail to quickly detect a 
naive blackhole attacker through a simple analysis. Suppose that a node’ trust value is 
approximately 1 (the node is very trustful) after it successfully forwarded 1,000 packets 
(that is, s = 1,000), and then the node starts dropping packets. As the number of 
consecutive drops n goes from 1 to 30, Figure 3.1 shows how their trust values T drop; 
Trust values in the beta trust model and the entropy trust model are calculated by (2.5) 
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and (2.8), respectively. Surprisingly, after 30 consecutive drops, the trust values in the 
beta trust model and the entropy trust model are 0.969 and 0.902, respectively, which 
means the blackhole attacker will not be detected unless we use very high trust 
thresholds. However, we cannot simply use a very high trust threshold, since it may 
misclassify many good nodes as untrustworthy nodes. Thus, we need to build a new trust 
model that considers consecutive drops such that it will significantly penalize a node’s trust 
value when it drops consecutive packets. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Beta and entropy trust models in the presence of consecutive packet drops. Even 
after 30 consecutive packet drops, the trust values in the beta trust model and the entropy trust 
model are still very high (i.e., TBeta ≈ 0.969 and T
*




3.3 Proposed Trust Model 
3.3.1 Hybrid Trust Model 
To show that trust evaluation using consecutive drops can effectively improve the 
early detection ability of a trust model, we propose a hybrid trust model that adaptively 
uses the popular beta trust model and our new trust model based on consecutive drops. As 
shown in Figure 3.2, on each report of the behavior of a node B (that is, node A wants to 
evaluate the trust of node B), our hybrid trust model in node A works as follows:  
• If the new behavior is a success, use the beta trust model; 
• If the new behavior is a failure, use the new trust model based on the number of 
consecutive drops (or consecutive failures).  
For a single failure, our new trust model will work like the beta trust model. For 
consecutive failures, our new trust model evaluates B’s trustworthiness based on the 




New trust model 
Beta trust model
if A overhears B’s 
forwarding (Success)





Figure 3.2: Hybrid trust model in node A. For each observation on node B’s behavior, when A 
observes that B forwards A’s packet successfully, A increases B’s trust value by using the beta 
trust model. Otherwise, A decreases B’s trust value by using the new trust model based on the 
number of consecutive drops. 
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3.3.2 New Trust Model 
3.3.2.1 Properties against Insider Packet Drop Attacks 
We demand that the new trust model has the following two properties:  
• Property 1: As the number of consecutive failures grows, we increase the trust-
decreasing rate. In other words, while we observe consecutive failures, we give a larger 
penalty for a new failure than the previous failures, because as the size of consecutive 
failures grows, our confidence that the consecutive failures are occurring due to attacks 
also grows. This property not only helps to quickly detect an attacker dropping packets 
consecutively, but also forces an intelligent inside attacker to stop launching many 
consecutive drops for fear of being caught by the trust model.  
• Property 2: Given two nodes B and C such that node A trusts B more than C 
based on the same number of their past behaviors (TA[B] > TA[C]), if both B and C are 
generating the same number of consecutive failures, A decreases on C’s trust more than 
on B’s trust. For example, consider the following case. B behaved well 40 times and 
behaved badly 20 times (sB = 40 and fB = 20), and node C behaved well 20 times and 
behaved badly 40 times (sC = 20 and fC = 40). Now both B and C are misbehaving five 
times consecutively. Intuitively, it is reasonable to lower C’s trust further than B, because 
C’s past behaviors are worse than node B. This property will work against grayhole 
attacks and on-off attacks. 
 
3.3.2.2 Design of New Trust Function 
We design a new trust function based on the number of consecutive failures. 
Every trust model decreases a certain amount of trust value when a failure occurs. We 
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consider the decreased amount of trust value as a penalty for the failure. We first design a 
penalty function PT(n) that determines how much we should lower the trust value of a 
node that is generating n consecutive failures. By using PT(n), given n consecutive 
failures, new trust function T(n) is formulated as 
 )()0()( nPTTnT   (3.1) 
where T(0) is the initial trust value of the evaluated node generating n consecutive 
failures at the evaluating node. 
We now explain how to determine the amount of penalty for n consecutive 
failures. Consider n consecutive failures f1f2…fi…fn whose i-th failure occurs at time t = i 
(1 ≤ i ≤ n). When t = 1, there is only one failure f1 and we assign α as a penalty to the 
single failure f1; Thus, PT(1) = α. When t = 2, another failure f2 occurs. Therefore, we 
assign α to the single failure f2. In addition, since we observe double failures f1f2 at t = 2, 
we give an extra penalty to f1f2. Let P[f] be the probability that a packet is dropped at the 
evaluated node. The probability that two consecutive failures occur is P[f]
2
 and our 
confidence that they should not occur is 1–P[f]
2
. Since we give α as the penalty to a 
single failure when we have confidence of 1–P[f], by multiplying α by the ratio of 
confidence, we can get the penalty to the double failure as α×(1–P[f]
2
)/(1-P[f]). Then, the 
total penalty to the two consecutive failures PT(2) is 2α + α×(1–P[f]
2
)/(1-P[f]) where 2α 
is the penalty for two single failures and α×(1–P[f]
2
)/(1-P[f]) is the penalty for one 







Table 3.1: Unit failure and unit penalty used in the penalty function PT(n). Unit penalty for each 
unit failure is obtained probabilistically by multiplying the base penalty α by the confidence ratio 
of the unit failures. 
Unit failure Probability Confidence Confidence ratio Unit penalty 
Single f P[f] 1-P[f] 1 α 
Double ff P[f]2 1-P[f]2 (1-P[f]2)/(1-P[f]) α×(1-P[f]2)/(1-P[f]) 
Triple fff P[f]3 1-P[f]3 (1-P[f]3)/(1-P[f]) α×(1-P[f]3)/(1-P[f]) 
n-tuple f…f P[f]n 1-P[f]n (1-P[f]n)/(1-P[f]) α×(1-P[f]n)/(1-P[f]) 
 
By this approach, to get PT(n), we first find all unit failures such as single failure, 
double failure, triple failure, and n-tuple failure within n consecutive failures. Given n 
consecutive failures, there are n single failures, n-1 double failures, n-2 triple failures… 
and one n-tuple failure. Next, as shown in Table 3.1, we calculate unit penalty for each 
unit failure probabilistically by multiplying the base penalty α by the confidence ratio of 



























































where α is a base penalty for a single failure.  













  (3.3) 
where P[f] = 1 – T(0) since T(0) is the expectation value of P[s] when n = 0 in the 
beta trust model.  
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To reduce the computation complexity, we have  
Theorem 3.1. The trust function T(n) defined in (3.3) satisfies  
 ;)()1()( nPTnTnT R  (3.4) 
 . )1(][)( nnPTfPnPT RR   (3.5) 
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3.3.2.3 Base Penalty α  
Next, we need to determine the value of the base penalty α. For a single failure 
(n=1), we assign the amount of penalty that the beta trust model gives for a single failure 
by which our new trust function works the same as the beta trust model. This approach 
helps to make it easy to design hybrid trust model as we explained in Section 3.3.1. Thus, 






























Meanwhile, as we have explained, for consecutive failures (n ≥ 2), we use our 
new trust model that penalizes the node generating the consecutive failures. However, 
since αn=1 in (3.9) is not inversely proportional to a node’s initial trust value T(0) and thus 
 45 
 
it does not satisfy Property 2. This is because of the design of the beta trust model. To 
satisfies Property 2, we use a different base penalty for n ≥ 2 by dividing α by the initial 













  (3.10) 
By (3.10), the base penalty of a node is adjusted according to the node’s initial 
trust value such that the base penalty of a node is fixed by the total number of past 
observations. By this approach, as we will show below, when a node is generating 
consecutive failures, its trust value will decrease depending on P[f] (= 1−T(0)). Thus, 
given the same number of s and f and the same consecutive failures, the total penalty of a 
node with a higher trust will be less than that of a node with a lower trust.    
 
Theorem 3.2. The trust function defined above satisfies Property 1 and Property 2.  
 
Proof. We prove Property 1 by showing that PT(n) is an increasing function and 
































nPTnPT   (3.12) 
By (3.11) – (3.12), (PT(n) – PT(n-1)) – (PT(n-1)  – PT(n-2)) = α(1-P[f]
n
)/(1-P[f]) 
> 0, since α > 0, n > 0 and 0 ≤ P[f] < 1. We assume P[f] ≠ 1. Thus, PT(n) satisfies 
Property 1.  
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Next, to prove Property 2, let two nodes 1 and 2 have the same number of past 
behaviors (s1, f1) and (s2, f2), respectively where s1 + f1 = s2 + f2. Assume that node 1’s 
trust value is higher than node 2’s trust value such that s1 ≥ s2 and f1 ≤ f2. They are 
generating n consecutive failures equally. Let α1 and α2 be base penalties of node 1 and 









thus α1 = α2 since s1 + f1 = s2 + f2. Given the same base penalty, since P[f] of node 1 is less 
than P[f] of node 2 according to (3.2) and (3.5), the total penalty of node 2 is larger than 
that of node 1. Therefore, the new trust function satisfies Property 2.                           ■  
                          
3.3.2.4 State Transition  
The hybrid trust model will adaptively choose either the beta trust model or the 
new trust model based on the occurrence of success or failure. Because the two trust 
models use different formulas to evaluate trust value on the same input values of s and f 
(the total number of successes and failures, respectively), they may give different trust 
values. When we switch from the beta trust model to the new trust model on consecutive 
failures, we can use the current values of s and f to determine base penalty and then apply 
the new trust model to evaluate trust value. However, when we switch back to the beta 
trust model, the current trust value (from the new trust model) will be lower than the 
value based on the beta trust model (see equation (2.5)). To continue using the beta trust 
model, we should adjust parameters of the beta trust model such that the beta trust model 
has the same trust value of our new trust model. We call this procedure state transition.    
One way to solve the state transition problem is to adjust the number of failures f 
in the beta trust model. Let TNew and TBeta be the trust values in new trust model and the 
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TNew  (3.13) 













3.3.2.5 Example of New Trust Model and Consecutive Drops 
We demonstrate how our trust model works by using the same example in Section 
3.2.2, and compare our trust model with the beta trust model and the entropy trust model. 
To remind you of the previous example, a node’s trust value is approximately 1 after it 
successfully forwarded 1,000 packets (that is, s = 1,000), then the node starts dropping all 
received packets. As the number of consecutive drops n goes from 1 to 30, Figure 3.3 
shows how their trust values T drop; the trust value in our new trust model is calculated 
by (3.4) and (3.5). For the first failure (n = 1), our new trust model penalizes the node as 
the same as the beta trust model does. However, as n grows, our trust model gradually 
increases the penalty to the node (Property 1), and the trust value goes below 0.6 when n 
= 30. Assuming that the same trust threshold is used, we can see that our trust model 
detects inside packet drop attackers much faster than the beta trust model and the entropy 
trust model. In addition, if the node is an intelligent attacker that knows how our trust 
model works against its packet drops, to avoid being detected by our trust model, the 
attacker will not launch long number of consecutive drops, which may lead to a failure in 
dropping consecutive critical packets completely as discussed in Section 3.1. In the rest 
of paper, we conduct extensive simulations based on the OPNET Modeler to show the 
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performance of our trust model in practical network environments. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: New trust model in the presence of consecutive packet drops. After 30 
consecutive packet drops, the trust value in the new trust model is very low (i.e., TNew ≈ 
0.534) while the trust values in the beta trust model and entropy trust model are still very 
high (i.e., TBeta ≈ 0.969 and T
*




3.4 Performance Evaluation 
3.4.1 Goals, Metrics, and Methodology 
3.4.1.1 Goals of Experiments 
Our main goal in this section is to show that our hybrid trust model that considers 
consecutive drops detects insider packet drop attacks more quickly and accurately than 
the beta trust model which does not consider consecutive drops in the packet routing 
domain. In addition, since a routing algorithm must deliver packets to the destination 
reliably and energy-efficiently even under insider packet drop attacks, we show how our 
hybrid trust model improves both reliability and energy-efficiency of a routing algorithm 
versus the beta trust model. We discuss reliability and energy-efficiency in more detail in 
Section 3.4.1.4. We conduct extensive simulations based on the OPNET Modeler. 
 
3.4.1.2 Routing Algorithms for Performance Evaluation 
For performance evaluation, we use the following three geographic greedy 
routing algorithms:  
 Geographic greedy routing without a trust model (Pure GRP); 
 Pure GRP with the beta trust model (Beta GRP); 
 Pure GRP with our hybrid trust model (Hybrid GRP) 
 
The Pure GRP (Geographic Routing Protocol) [21] provided by the OPNET 
Modeler is a geographic greedy routing that works very similarly with the GPSR that we 
introduced in Section 2.6. We implemented two trust-based geographic greedy routings 
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(Beta GRP and Hybrid GRP) based on the GRP and two trust models (the beta trust 
model and our hybrid trust model) in the OPNET Modeler. 
The main difference between the three routings is the neighbor selection 
algorithm (NSA) by which a sending node S finds a next hop H to forward its packet to 
H. Algorithm 1 shows the neighbor selection algorithm of the Pure GRP. In the Pure GRP, 
just like the GPSR, a sending node S selects a next hop H that is the closest one to the 
destination from its neighbor set NS.  
 
Algorithm 1 (NSA in the pure GRP) 
Input : Sender S, Destination D, and S’s neighbor set NS 
Output : Next hop node H 
1: dMIN := dist (S, D);   
2: for each node ni in NS do 
3:       calculate dist (ni, D); 
4:       if (dist (ni, D) < dMIN) then 
5:             H := ni; 
6:             dMIN := dist (ni, D);  
 
On the other hand, in the trust-based GRP such as the Beta GRP or the Hybrid 
GRP, as shown in Algorithm 2, a sending node S finds a next hop H that is the closest one 
to the destination among its neighbors whose trust value is equal to or higher than the 
trust threshold TH. The only difference between two trust-based GRPs is the difference of 
trust models that they use. 
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Algorithm 2 (NSA in the trust-based GRP) 
Input : Sender S, Destination D, and S’s neighbor set NS, Trust threshold TH 
Output : Next hop node H 
1: dMIN := dist (S, D);        
2: for each node ni in NS do 
3:       calculate dist (ni, D) and T(ni);   // T(ni) is the trust value of node ni 
4:       if (d (ni, D) < dMIN and T(ni) ≥ TH) then 
5:             H := ni; 
6:               dMIN := dist (ni, D); 
 
3.4.1.3 Packet Drop Attack Models 
We use two types of packet drop attacks in simulations. 
 Blackhole attack: Drop all received data packets (attack rate is 100%); 
 Grayhole attack: Drop received data packets randomly according to various 
attack rates that range from 20% to 80%. 
In our simulations, the attacker drops only data packets, and forwards other types 
of packets such as control packets. As shown in Figure 3.4, we implemented packet drop 
attack models at the network layer of a wireless node in the OPNET Modeler, since a 
node can determine whether a received packet is either a data packet or a control packet 
when the packet reaches the network layer. When an attacker receives a data packet from 
a node, the attacker sends an ACK message back to the sender, and then decides whether 
it drops the data packet based on a pre-defined attack rate. For example, if the attack rate 
is 100%, the (blackhole) attacker drops all received packets. If the attack rate is 50%, the 
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(grayhole) attacker randomly drops 50% of the received data packets. If an attacker 
decides to forward a data packet, it simply transmits the packet to a next hop node (a 
relay node or the BS). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Implementation of packet drop attacks models in the OPNET Modeler. When an 
attacker receives a data packet from a node, the attacker sends an ACK message back to the 
sender, and then decides whether it drops the data packet based on a pre-defined attack rate. 
 
3.4.1.4 Performance Evaluation Metrics  
We compare the Pure GRP, the Beta GRP, and our proposed Hybrid GRP in terms 
of the following performance evaluation metrics: 
1) Detection completion time (DCT): DCT is defined as the simulation time 
(seconds) when all attackers are detected by victim nodes whose packets are dropped by 
the attackers. DCT evaluates how quickly a trust model detects attackers. 
2) Detection rate (DR) and False alarm rate (FAR): As shown in Table 3.2, node i 


























node i. Node i may either correctly detect an attacker as an untrustworthy node (Hit) or 
fail in detecting it (Miss). DR is the probability that an attacker is being considered as an 
untrustworthy node. On the other hand, a trust model may misclassify a normal node 
(non-attacker) into an untrustworthy node (False alarm). We get FAR as the number of 
false alarms divided by the number of normal nodes as defined in [23]. Unlike DR (0 ≤ 
DR ≤ 1), this FAR can be over 1.0, since a node can be falsely detected multiple times by 
its neighbors. We use DR and FAR to evaluate the detection accuracy of a trust model.  
 
Table 3.2: Detection and false alarm in trust-based attacker detection problem 
 Decision result 
Given node is Untrustworthy Trustworthy 
Attacker Hit (Detection) Miss 
Non-attacker False alarm Correct rejection 
 
3) Packet delivery rate (PDR): PDR is the probability that a data packet is 
successfully delivered to the base station. A reliable trust-based routing will deliver most 
of the data packets to the destination even in the presence of inside packet drop attackers 
in the network. We use PDR to evaluate the reliability of a trust-based routing.   
4) Total energy consumption (ET) and Energy efficiency (eS): For energy 
consumption analysis, we consider the total amount of energy consumed by transmitting 
and receiving data packets, ET (J). To get ET, we use the first order radio model [26]. In 
this model, the amounts of energy required to send a k bit packet over distance d, ETx, and 
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where Eelec is the energy dissipation of the radio to run the transmitter and 
receiver circuitry and is 50nJ/bit, and Eamp is the energy dissipation for the transmit 
amplifier and is 100pJ/bit/m
2
. By using (3.15) and (3.16), we get the total energy 
consumption for data packet delivery ET by summing ETx and ERx for all nodes in the 
network. In addition, to see how efficiently a routing works in terms of energy, we use the 







e   (3.17) 
where NS is the total number of packets successfully delivered to the base station. 
The energy efficiency eS indicates the average energy consumption to successfully deliver 
one data packet to the destination.  
5) Other metrics (NT, NA, and NNA): NT is the total number of data packets 
generated by all source nodes, NA is the total number of data packets dropped due to 
attacks, and NNA is the total number of packets dropped due to other network problems 
(non-attacks) such as collision or noise.  
 
3.4.1.5 OPNET Simulation Setup 
The parameters in Table 3.3 are used in our simulations. An ad hoc WSN with 50 
sensor nodes is built in a 1km × 1km area as shown in Figure 3.5. We place a single base 
station (BS) at one corner and every other sensor will generate and send data packets to 
the BS. We use the default OPNET setting of data packet size (1,024 bits) and 
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transmission power to 0.001W. For the channel access model, we use CSMA/CA (Carrier 
Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance) with maximum seven retransmissions 
(default value in OPNET). Each node generates a data packet randomly within each 10-
second period since the simulation time 100 seconds elapse, and forwards it toward the 
BS based on its routing algorithm such as the Pure GRP, the Beta GRP, and our Hybrid 
GRP. For trust models, we use three different trust thresholds (THs) of 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8. 
Considering a practical assumption that attackers develop a high trust value before 
launching attacks [20], we set an initial trust value of each node to be approximately 0.99. 
We place single or multiple attackers near the BS so that attackers can receive many data 
packets from nodes. Attackers start launching pre-defined attacks (blackhole attack or 
grayhole attack) once they receive data packets. By considering our simulation PC’s 
performance (Pentium CPU 3GHz and RAM 2GB), we set the maximum simulation time 
to be three hours (10,800 seconds) to find Detection Completion Time DCT. 
 





Table 3.3: OPNET simulation setup parameters 
Parameters Setting 
General 
Terrain dimension 1km × 1km 
Number of nodes 50 
Topology Random 
Max. simulation time 3 hours (10,800 seconds) 
Number of runs 10 
Base routing algorithm GRP 
Sensor 
Transmission power 0.001W (OPNET default) 
Max. retransmissions 7 (OPNET default) 
Data packet 
Generation 
Start time – Stop time 100 seconds – end of simulation 
Destination Base station 
Packet arrival interval Every 10 second 
Packet size 1,024 bits 
Trust model 
Type None, Beta, and Hybrid 
Initial trust value 0.99 
Trust threshold (TH) 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 
Attack model 
Number of attackers 
Single attacker and 
Multiple attackers (3, 5, 8) 
Attack type 
Blackhole (attack rate 100%) and 




3.4.2 Simulation Results 
We first compare three routing algorithms in the presence of the single attacker 
and multiple attackers in a WSN without bursty transmission errors. Then, we compare 
them in a WSN with bursty transmission errors. 
 
3.4.2.1 Single Attacker 
Table 3.4 shows all simulation results in a single attacker case. All performance 
evaluation metrics in the first column are introduced in Section 3.4.1.4. When DCTs of 
both trust-based routings (Beta GRP and our Hybrid GRP) are found within maximum 
simulation time (three hours), for comparison, we show the value of each metric 
measured at the slower one’s DCT. When any of trust-based routing fails in finding DCT 
within the maximum simulation time, we show all metrics measured at the maximum 
simulation time (three hours). The Pure GRP is compared to see how seriously the 










Table 3.4: Simulation results (Single Attacker): DCT: Detection completion time; FAR: False 
alarm rate; NA: the total number of data packets dropped due to attacks; NNA: the total number of 
packets dropped due to other network problems (non-attacks) such as collision or noise; PDR: 
Packet delivery rate; ET: Total energy consumption; eS: Energy efficiency. 
(a) TH = 0.6 
Attack rate % 100 80 60 40 30 20 
DCT 
Beta 781 1155 2095 *0.04 *0.02 *0.02 
Hybrid 183 244 457 1846 *0.88 *0.02 
FAR 
Beta 0 0.037 0.039 0.097 0.104 0.097 
Hybrid 0.072 0.102 0.118 0.127 0.125 0.112 
NA 
GRP 661 820 1115 3883 2914 1894 
Beta 331 397 551 4176 3177 2078 
Hybrid 44 64 96 265 989 2139 
NNA 
GRP 336 509 946 4942 4931 4964 
Beta 364 515 858 2690 2702 2703 
Hybrid 282 364 591 1983 2002 1859 
PDR 
GRP 0.711 0.747 0.790 0.828 0.847 0.866 
Beta 0.799 0.825 0.856 0.866 0.885 0.906 
Hybrid 0.906 0.918 0.929 0.956 0.941 0.922 
ET 
(J) 
GRP 84.9 129.8 242.1 1272.1 1272.9 1274.8 
Beta 86.0 131.7 245.6 1290.2 1290.5 1292.9 
Hybrid 88.0 133.9 248.7 1305.7 1306.0 1293.3 
eS 
(mJ) 
GRP 34.61 32.98 31.34 29.88 26.97 28.63 
Beta 31.14 30.27 29.35 28.97 27.50 27.73 






(b) TH = 0.7 
Attack rate % 100 80 60 40 30 20 
DCT 
Beta 522 774 1083 4190 *0.16 *0.02 
Hybrid 151 241 396 1123 2030 *0.02 
FAR 
Beta 0.002 0.037 0.045 0.125 0.114 0.112 
Hybrid 0.081 0.108 0.116 0.141 0.135 0.131 
NA 
GRP 427 534 595 1643 2914 1894 
Beta 213 236 278 580 2858 2113 
Hybrid 39 53 77 163 255 2134 
NNA 
GRP 225 335 479 1975 4931 4964 
Beta 243 336 460 1190 2320 2118 
Hybrid 188 251 304 828 1853 1719 
PDR 
GRP 0.712 0.747 0.784 0.828 0.847 0.866 
Beta 0.798 0.833 0.850 0.904 0.899 0.917 
Hybrid 0.899 0.911 0.922 0.947 0.958 0.925 
ET 
(J) 
GRP 55.2 84.5 121.3 498.8 1272.9 1274.8 
Beta 56.0 86.0 123.2 511.7 1295.1 1291.7 
Hybrid 57.0 87.1 124.6 512.5 1304.7 1293.6 
eS 
(mJ) 
GRP 34.29 32.95 31.48 29.87 29.26 28.63 
Beta 31.18 30.06 29.50 28.05 28.00 27.41 












(c) TH = 0.8 
 
Attack rate % 100 80 60 40 30 20 
DCT 
Beta 342 424 558 1112 1771 *0.12 
Hybrid 151 212 295 597 1062 7376 
FAR 
Beta 0.014 0.039 0.043 0.104 0.118 0.141 
Hybrid 0.072 0.087 0.110 0.133 0.141 0.189 
NA 
GRP 256 280 288 397 474 1894 
Beta 123 128 139 183 240 2063 
Hybrid 29 42 57 84 120 432 
NNA 
GRP 141 182 243 508 838 4964 
Beta 148 183 231 375 482 1759 
Hybrid 121 142 175 259 365 1474 
PDR 
GRP 0.708 0.739 0.779 0.822 0.843 0.866 
Beta 0.801 0.823 0.845 0.888 0.912 0.925 
Hybrid 0.890 0.894 0.903 0.932 0.941 0.962 
ET 
(J) 
GRP 33.1 43.3 59.1 125.1 203.8 1274.8 
Beta 33.7 43.8 60.0 127.8 208.4 1294.2 
Hybrid 34.3 44.2 60.7 128.4 208.9 1304.9 
eS 
(mJ) 
GRP 34.63 33.31 31.66 30.06 29.35 28.63 
Beta 31.08 30.27 29.65 28.40 27.74 27.18 




We explain the results in detail in terms of detection speed, detection accuracy, 
routing reliability, and energy-efficiency in turn. 
1) Detection speed and the damage to the network  
To compare how quickly each trust model detects the inside packet drop attacker, 
we first examine the DCT of each routing algorithm as shown in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.6 
When DCT is not found within three hours, we show DR instead; we will explain DR in 
detail in 2) Detection accuracy. In general, when TH is fixed, as the attack rate grows, 
DCT decreases because the attacker drops more packets, its trust value decreases faster, 
and thus it is detected quicker by trust models. When the attack rate is fixed, as TH 
grows, DCT decreases because a trust model with a higher TH detects the attacker faster 
than the same trust model with a lower TH. 
 
(a) TH = 0.6 
 
(b) TH = 0.7 
 
(c) TH = 0.8 
 
Figure 3.6: Detection completion time DCT (Single attacker). Our Hybrid GRP detects an inside 
packet drop attacker always faster than the Beta GRP in the presence of various attack models. 
 
The results show the following: 
First, our Hybrid GRP can detect an inside packet drop attacker much faster than 
the Beta GRP under various attack models, regardless of TH. When both trust models 
detect the attacker, our hybrid trust model can detect it at least 2.7 times and at most 4.7 
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times faster than the beta trust model. We found that when the attack rate is set to be 100 
× (1−TH), the beta trust model fails in detecting the attacker (i.e., DCT was not found) 
but our trust model can detect it. However, when the attack rate is set to be too low, both 
trust models failed in detecting the attacker. 
Second, detection speed is closely related to the damage to the network caused by 
the attackers. The early detection capability of our hybrid trust model based on 
consecutive drops significantly reduces the damage to the network due to attacks 
compared to that of the beta trust model. In case of the Pure GRP, NA continuously grows 
as the simulation proceeds since it does not have a trust mechanism, and thus cannot 
defend against the attacker. For the Beta GRP and our Hybrid GRP, when DCT is found, 
NA stops growing because the attacker is completely detected by all victim nodes (see 
Figure 3.7(a) and Figure 3.7(b). In addition, we can see the Beta GRP’s NA is more than 
3.5 times larger than our Hybrid GRP’s NA. Also, as shown in Figure 3.7(c), when the 
Beta GRP cannot find the attacker, NA grows continuously, and this degrades the 
performance of a routing as we will discuss in detail in 3) Reliability. 
 
(a) Attack rate = 100% 
 
(b) Attack rate = 60% 
 
(c) Attack rate = 30% 
 
Figure 3.7: The total number of packets dropped due to attacks NA when TH = 0.7 (Single attacker). 
The early detection capability of our hybrid trust model based on consecutive drops significantly 
reduces the damage to the network due to attacks compared to that of the beta trust model. 
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2) Detection accuracy 
In addition to early detection capability, a good trust model must have high 
detection accuracy, which can be evaluated by using DR and FAR. Thus, a desired trust 
model has a high DR and a low FAR. A comparison of the detection accuracy of the beta 
trust model and our hybrid trust model is as follows: 
First, our hybrid trust model can detect an inside packet drop attacker not only 
more quickly but also more accurately than the beta trust model. We already 
demonstrated that our hybrid trust model can detect the attacker much faster than the beta 
trust model in 1) Detection speed and the damage to the network. Figure 3.8 shows how 
DRs of the Beta GRP and our Hybrid GRP change as the simulation time t proceeds when 
TH is 0.7. In this figure, the value of (1 – DR) at time t indicates the percentage of victim 
nodes that cannot detect the attacker. That is, the difference between DRs of two trust 
models shows the difference of attacker detection accuracy of two trust models. The DR 
of our hybrid trust model is always above that of the beta trust model, which means that 
victim nodes with our hybrid trust model always detect the attacker faster and more 
accurately than victim nodes with the beta trust model.  
 
(a) Attack rate = 100% 
 
(b) Attack rate = 60% 
 
(c) Attack rate = 30% 
 
Figure 3.8: Detection rate DR when TH = 0.7 (Single attacker). The difference of DRs shows the 
difference of attack detection accuracy of two trust models (Beta and hybrid trust models). 
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In particular, the beta trust model cannot completely detect the attacker when the 
attack rate is set to be equal to or less than 100 × (1 − TH). Meanwhile, our hybrid trust 
model can detect the attacker whose attack rate is 100 × (1 − TH). For example, in Figure 
3.8(c), when the attack rate = 30% and TH = 0.7, more than 80% of victim nodes with the 
beta trust model fail to detect the attacker within the maximum simulation time (10,800 
seconds). Meanwhile, all victim nodes with our hybrid trust model detected the attacker 
in the early stage (within 2,030 seconds). This is due to the limitation of the design of the 
beta trust model. That is, in the beta trust model, if an attacker continues to drop 30% of 
received packets randomly, its trust value T gradually lowers to 0.7 according to (2.5). In 
practice, the attacker is likely to start dropping packets after it has a high trust value [20] 
to avoid being detected by a trust model. For this reason, such an attacker’s trust value 
hardly falls below 0.7, and thus the beta trust model with TH = 0.7 fails to detect it. On 
the other hand, our hybrid trust model significantly penalizes such an attacker’s repeating 
consecutive drops, and thus can detect the attacker with the same trust threshold. 
However, when the attack rate is less than 100 × (1 – TH), both the beta trust model and 
our hybrid trust model failed to detect the attacker. When the attacker knows the trust 
threshold, it can estimate its trust value before dropping any packet to make sure that 
he/she will never be caught. Although our hybrid trust model cannot defend against such 
an attacker, the damage that the attacker can cause to the network is limited according to 
TH. For example, when TH is 0.7, the attacker cannot drop more than 30% of packets 
without being caught. It will be interesting (and challenging) to study this problem, for 
example from the point of view of Game Theory [13]. However, since a detailed 
discussion to address this problem is out of the scope of this dissertation, we leave it to 
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our future work.     
Second, our hybrid trust model generates a small FAR that is slightly higher than 
that of the beta trust model. High FAR must be avoided, because it may negatively affect 
network connectivity, decrease the number of available relay nodes in the network, and 
thus significantly degrade the packet delivery performance of a routing protocol. As 
shown in Table 3.4, we see that both our Hybrid GRP and Beta GRP do not have a high 
FAR. Our Hybrid GRP has a slightly higher FAR than that of the Beta GRP since our 
hybrid trust model gives a larger penalty to a node generating consecutive drops than the 
beta trust model. In practice, packets can be dropped consecutively due to some network 
problems as well as attacks. Therefore, this result was expected. In fact, as we will 
discuss below, this small FAR does not degrade the packet delivery performance of our 
Hybrid GRP but helps to improve its the packet delivery performance. Based on this 
result, we consider that this small FAR is acceptable in order to get high detection accuracy.   
3) Routing reliability  
The final goal of a routing algorithm in a WSN is to deliver data packets from 
source nodes to the BS. Therefore, a good trust-based routing algorithm should be able to 
deliver packets to the destination successfully even under insider packet drop attacks. We 
examine the routing reliability of each routing based on PDR. Recall that a single attacker 
is deployed near the BS to receive the significant number of data packets from many 
nodes throughout the network.  
As shown in Table 3.4, our Hybrid GRP has the highest PDR among three routing 
algorithms and can deliver at least more than 89% of packets to the BS in all simulation 
setups. This result shows that our Hybrid GRP can route packets very reliably even under 
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various packet drop attacks. Specifically, our Hybrid GRP improves PDR of the Pure 
GRP by at most 19% and PDR of the Beta GRP by at most 10% (when the attack rate 
=100% and TH=0.6 as shown in Figure 3.9(a)).  
 
   
(a) TH = 0.6 (b) TH = 0.7 (c) TH = 0.8 
Figure 3.9: Packet delivery rate PDR (Single attacker). Our Hybrid GRP has the highest PDR 
among three routing algorithms (GRP, Beta GRP, and Hybrid GRP) and can deliver at least more 
than 89% of packets to the BS in all simulation setups. 
 
Since PDR is determined by two metrics NA and NNA, we examine them in turn. 
First, as we explained in 1) Detection speed, our Hybrid GRP has the smallest NA 
among three routing algorithms as shown in Figure 3.7, because our Hybrid GRP detects 
the attacker quickly based on consecutive drops and finds a new path to the BS through a 
trustworthy node. The Beta GRP has larger NA than our Hybrid GRP because it has 
slower detection speed than our Hybrid GRP. Since the Pure GRP does not use any trust 
model, it has the most significant amount of packet loss by the attacker.   
Second, our Hybrid GRP has the least NNA among three routing algorithms. 
Packets can be naturally dropped in a WSN because of many reasons such as collision 
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and congestion. The OPNET simulates channel quality problems such as collision and 
congestion. As shown in Table 3.4, our Hybrid GRP and the Beta GRP has less NNA than 
that of the Pure GRP. This is because a trust-based routing algorithm can avoid bad 
communication links by classifying normal nodes (non-attackers) with many 
transmission errors as untrustworthy nodes. This causes both the Beta GRP and our 
Hybrid GRP to generate a small FAR, as we discussed before, but it improves the PDR of 
a trust-based routing algorithm. For the same reason as discussed in 1) Detection speed, 
when such normal nodes in bad links generate many consecutive drops, our Hybrid GRP 
penalizes them based on the number of consecutive drops and thus quickly avoids them. 
As a result, our Hybrid GRP has less NNA than the Beta GRP as shown in Figure 3.10. In 
practice, it is often assumed that WSNs have hundreds of sensors in order to be tolerant 
to many faulty sensors and thus a small FAR may not be a problem. 
 
   
(a) Attack rate = 100% (b) Attack rate = 60% (c) Attack rate = 30% 
Figure 3.10: The total number of packets dropped due to non-attacks NNA when TH = 0.7 (Single 
attacker). Our Hybrid GRP has the least NNA among three routing algorithms (GRP, Beta GRP, 
and Hybrid GRP) by penalizing nodes in bad links based on the number of consecutive drops and 





We now compare the energy efficiency of each routing algorithm. The results 
show the following:  
First, the total energy consumption of each routing algorithm is as follows: ET of 
our Hybrid GRP > ET of the Beta GRP > ET of the Pure GRP as shown in Table 3.4. ET is 
closely related to PDR. In the Pure GRP, a sender continues to forward data packets to a 
neighbor closest to the BS even though an attacker keeps dropping the packets. This is 
because the Pure GRP does not have a mechanism to monitor neighbors’ packet 
transmission behaviors. The Pure GRP has the least PDR, which means the largest 
amount of data packets are dropped before reaching to the BS. Consequently, the Pure 
GRP has the least amount of energy consumption for packet transmissions and 
receptions. Likewise, the Beta GRP has less ET than our Hybrid GRP. In addition, a trust-
based routing like our Hybrid GRP and the Beta GRP are likely to have longer average 
hops or longer average routing distance from a source to the BS than the Pure GRP. This 
is because a trust-based routing avoids an inside packet drop attacker and normal nodes 
with many transmission errors, and then finds another node. The avoided nodes are 
originally chosen optimal nodes in terms of minimum hops; we note that the greedy 
geographic routing approximates the minimum hop routing [8], and thus we assume that 
the avoided node is likely to be in the shortest path to the BS. Since ET does not correctly 
evaluate the energy-efficiency of a routing, we use the energy-efficiency eS for energy 
analysis.  
Second, our Hybrid GRP consumes the least energy to deliver a packet to the BS 
among three routing algorithms. As shown in Table 3.4, the energy-efficiency eS of each 
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routing is as follows: eS of Pure GRP > eS of Beta GRP > eS of Hybird GRP. Especially, as 
shown in Figure 3.11, when the attack rate = 100% and TH = 0.6, our Hybrid GRP can 
save approximately 19% of energy as compared to the Pure GRP and 10% of energy as 
compared to the Beta GRP, which correspond to 6.61 mJ and 3.14 mJ, respectively. To 
help you understand, according to the first radio model (3.15) and (3.16), 6.61 mJ is the 
amount of energy that a node consumes to transmit a 1,024-bit packet to another node 
that is approximately 253m away.  
 
(a) TH = 0.6 
 
(b) TH = 0.7 
 
(c) TH = 0.8 
 
Figure 3.11: Energy efficiency eS. (Single attacker). Our Hybrid GRP consumes the least energy 
to deliver a packet to the BS among three routing algorithms (GRP, Beta GRP, and Hybrid GRP). 
 
3.4.2.2 Multiple Attackers 
We examine how each routing algorithm performs in the presence of multiple 
attackers. We assume that attackers are not colluding. To deploy multiple attackers in the 
network, we randomly choose 5, 8, and 10 relay nodes as attackers, which correspond to 
5%, 10%, and 15% of total nodes in the network, respectively. We use three attack rates 
such as 30%, 60%, and 100%. For the trust threshold, we use 0.7. We compare all 
performance evaluation metrics recorded at the maximum simulation time (three hours). 
Since we thoroughly examined the detection speed of each routing in the single attacker 
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case, we do not provide DCT here. In summary, the results in the multiple attacker case 
are similar with the results in the single attacker case. We briefly report the results.  
First, we report DR and FAR. Like the single attacker case, as shown in Figure 
3.12, our hybrid trust model based on consecutive drops has a very high DR in all 
simulations setups. Meanwhile, the Beta GRP has a low DR in the presence of multiple 
grayhole attackers with 30% of attack rate. On the other hand, our hybrid trust model also 
has a slightly higher FAR than the beta trust model (see Figure 3.13). However, as we will 
show PDR below, this small FAR (due to nodes in bad links) does not degrade the packet 
delivery performance of our Hybrid GRP but improves it. 
 
(a) 3 attackers (5%) 
 
(b) 5 attackers (10%) 
 
(c) 8 attackers (15%) 
Figure 3.12: Detection rate DR (Multiple attackers). Our hybrid trust model based on consecutive 
drops has a very high DR in all simulations setups. 
 
(a) 3 attackers (5%) 
 
(b) 5 attackers (10%) 
 
(c) 8 attackers (15%) 
Figure 3.13: False alarm rate FAR (Multiple attacks). Our hybrid trust model has a slightly higher 
FAR than the beta trust model. 
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Second, we report NA, NNA, and PDR. In summary, as shown in Figure 3.14, 
Figure 3.15, and Figure 3.16, our Hybrid GRP has the least NA and NNA, and the highest 
PDR among the three routing algorithms in the presence of multiple attackers. As shown 
in Figure 3.14, it is not surprising that NA grows as the number of attackers grows. 
Especially, in case of the Pure GRP, we can see that multiple attackers (especially when 
they are blackhole attackers) drop a very large number of packets since the Pure GRP 
does not have any defensive mechanism such as the trust mechanism against the multiple 
attackers. Meanwhile, both our Hybrid GRP and the Beta GRP have much less NA than 
the Pure GRP since their trust mechanisms can defend against the multiple attackers. In 
addition, thanks to the trust evaluation scheme using consecutive drops, our Hybrid GRP 
is able to further decrease NA compared with the Beta GRP. On the other hand, NNA does 
not significantly change as the number of attackers grows as shown in Figure 3.15. As in 
the single attacker case, our Hybrid GRP has the least NNA because some normal nodes 
(non-attackers) with many transmission errors are detected (as false alarms) by our hybrid 
trust model. Last, our Hybrid GRP has the highest PDR as shown in Figure 3.16. We 
clearly see that our Hybrid GRP can deliver most of packets to the BS very reliably even 
in the presence of multiple attackers with various attack rates. It is particularly impressive 
that our Hybrid GRP can deliver approximately 92% of data packets from source nodes 
to the BS successfully even when 15% of nodes in the network are grayhole attackers that 
are randomly dropping 30% of packets while the Pure GRP and the Beta GRP can deliver 
only 71% and 78% of data packets to the BS, respectively. In other words, when 
compared with the Pure GRP, the Beta GRP without considering consecutive drops can 




(a) 3 attackers (5%) 
 
(b) 5 attackers (10%) 
 
(c) 8 attackers (15%) 
Figure 3.14: The number of packet drops due to attacks NA (Multiple attackers). Our Hybrid GRP 
has the least NA among three routing algorithms (GRP, Beta GRP, and Hybrid GRP). 
 
(a) 3 attackers (5%) 
 
(b) 5 attackers (10%) 
 
(c) 8 attackers (15%) 
Figure 3.15: The number of packet drops due to non-attacks NNA (Multiple attackers). Our Hybrid 
GRP has the least NNA among three routing algorithms (GRP, Beta GRP, and Hybrid GRP). 
 
(a) 3 attackers (5%) 
 
(b) 5 attackers (10%) 
 
(c) 8 attackers (15%) 
Figure 3.16: Packet delivery rate PDR (Multiple attackers). Our Hybrid GRP has the highest PDR 




Finally, we report eS. Our Hybrid GRP has the least eS among the three routing 
algorithms as shown in Figure 3.17. Like the single attacker case, our Hybrid GRP 
consumes the smallest amount of energy to deliver a data packet to the BS. In practice, 
the network operation time is much greater than our maximum simulation time (three 
hours). Therefore, when there are inside packet drop attackers in the network, the Pure 
GRP and the Beta GRP will waste a lot of energy for unsuccessful packet transmissions.  
   
(a) 3 attackers (5%) (b) 5 attackers (10%) (c) 8 attackers (15%) 
Figure 3.17: Energy efficiency eS (Multiple attackers). Our Hybrid GRP has the least eS among 
three routing algorithms (GRP, Beta GRP, and Hybrid GRP). 
 
3.4.2.3 Performance Comparison in a WSN with Temporal Bursty Errors 
In this section, we examine how our hybrid trust model works in a WSN where 
packets can be dropped consecutively due to fading or temporal obstacles as well as 
insider packet drop attacks.  
We simulate such WSN in OPNET as follows. We deploy two blackhole attackers 
near the BS. In our simulation setup, 4% of packets are dropped naturally. We consider 
this natural packet drop rate as a normal error rate when there are no temporal errors in a 
WSN. Let the temporal error factor k be 1 at the normal error rate. To simulate temporal 
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bursty errors in a WSN, we temporarily increase the error rate by multiplying the normal 
error rate (=4%) by various k (up to 25) during some time duration (say, temporal error 
period). Then, during the period, packets are dropped with the increased error rate. We 
randomly choose 40% of nodes in which packets are dropped with various error rates 
during various error periods such as 600s, 1,200s, and 1,800s. The temporal error period 
starts randomly during the simulation. The higher error rate and the longer error period, 
the more packets are dropped during the error period; thus, the higher chance that packets 
are dropped consecutively. 
We explain results by using two performance metrics such as false alarm rate and 
packet drop rate. 
First, our hybrid trust model does not generate a high false alarm even in a WSN 
with various error rates and error periods. As shown in Table 3.5, in most setups except 
when the error rate is extremely high, the false alarm rate of our hybrid trust model is the 
same as that in a normal error rate. This is because the large consecutive drops are not 
likely to occur even when the temporal error rate is higher than the normal error rate. 
Meanwhile, when the error rate is set to be extremely high such as 100%, the false alarm 
rate of our hybrid trust model is slightly increased to 0.11 because, in this setup, all 
packets are dropped consecutively, but the false alarm rate of the beta trust model is also 
increased to 0.02 when the temporal error period is 1,800 seconds. 
Second, our hybrid trust model significantly reduces the packet drop rate of a 
routing even in a WSN with various error rates and error periods. As shown in Table 3.5, 
when either the error rate or the error period grows, the packet drop rate of each routing 
also grows because packets are dropped more during the temporal error period. Figure 
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3.18 shows in detail the reasons for packet drops at various error rates when the error 
period is set to be 1,200 seconds; in the figure, the number of packet drops due to attacks, 
temporal errors and other network problems are depicted as Attack (black), Temp (gray) 
and Others (white), respectively. When the Pure GRP is used, most of packet drops occur 
due to the two undetected blackhole attackers. Meanwhile, since both trust-based routings 
can catch the attackers, they can dramatically reduce the packet drop rate compared to the 
Pure GRP. In fact, our hybrid trust model avoids problematic nodes under the influence of 
temporal errors or collisions as well as attackers much faster than the beta trust model. 
Consequently, our hybrid trust model can further reduce packet drops. 
 
 
Figure 3.18: The number of packet drops at various error rates when the error period is set to 
be 1,200 seconds. Our hybrid trust model significantly reduces the packet drop rate of a 





Table 3.5: False alarm rate and packet drop rate in a WSN with temporal bursty errors 
(a) Error period = 600 seconds 
Error period 600s 
Error rate % k 
FAR Packet Drop Rate % 
Beta Hybrid GRP Beta Hybrid 
4 1 0 0.09 35.96 5.03 1.30 
12 3 0 0.09 36.07 5.29 1.46 
28 7 0 0.09 36.20 5.58 1.65 
56 14 0 0.09 36.34 5.82 1.84 
72 18 0 0.09 36.40 5.92 2.25 
100 25 0 0.11 36.56 6.40 2.50 
 
(b) Error period = 1,200 seconds 
Error period 1,200s 
Error rate % k 
FAR Packet Drop Rate % 
Beta Hybrid GRP Beta Hybrid 
4 1 0 0.09 35.96 5.03 1.30 
12 3 0 0.09 36.03 5.45 1.64 
28 7 0 0.09 36.27 5.73 1.98 
56 14 0 0.09 36.61 6.33 2.65 
72 18 0 0.09 36.75 6.62 3.02 







(c) Error period = 1,200 seconds 
Error period 1,200s 
Error rate % k 
FAR Packet Drop Rate % 
Beta Hybrid GRP Beta Hybrid 
4 1 0 0.09 35.96 5.03 1.30 
12 3 0 0.09 36.17 5.53 1.66 
28 7 0 0.09 36.36 5.82 2.14 
56 14 0 0.09 36.76 6.56 3.04 
72 18 0.02 0.09 36.93 6.72 3.45 
100 25 0.02 0.11 37.38 7.59 3.81 
 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we propose to use consecutive drops for quick and accurate 
detection of inside packet drop attackers, design a new trust model that probabilistically 
penalizes attackers based on the consecutive drops, and build a hybrid trust model that 
adaptively uses the popular beta trust model and our new trust model. Extensive 
simulation results demonstrate that our hybrid trust model outperforms the beta trust 
model under various packet drop attacks in terms of detection speed, detection accuracy, 
routing reliability, and energy-efficiency. 
There are several directions for future work. First, our results on network with 
lossy network show fairly large FAR. How to improve the accuracy of the proposed 
approach in such network is still a challenge. To address this problem, we study false 
alarm recovery problem in Chapter 4. Second, after the inside attackers become aware of 
our hybrid trust model, how they can respond to the challenge and launch more 
sophisticated attacks.  
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Chapter 4  
FADER: False Alarm Detection and Recovery Mechanism 
 
4.1 Overview 
Trust-based routing approaches can gracefully mitigate insider packet drop 
attacks by building trusted paths to the destination. It is shown that trust-based routing 
improves the packet’s successful delivery under insider packet drop attacks over routing 
algorithms that do not consider trust [12, 16, 22, 25, 71, 72, 73]. Clearly, the effectiveness 
of these trust-based routing protocols is based on their underlying trust models. A good 
trust model will help the routing algorithm to quickly and accurately identify inside 
packet drop attackers and find alternate routes to avoid them. However, as we have 
mentioned, it is challenging to distinguish the natural packet drops due to network 
problems from the intentional packet drops by the inside attackers. No trust model can 
detect all the inside attackers (100% detection rate) and not misclassify any of the good 
nodes (0% false alarm rate) [28]. While most of the existing approaches focus on how to 
improve the detection rate, we study the situation when the false alarm rate is high.  
The rationale behind this study is as follows. First, natural packet drops do occur 
in WSN due to fading, interference, collision, noise, congestion, and others [4, 32]. In 
certain circumstances such as weather change or moving objects, there may be an 
abnormality in the WSN’s operating environment which will cause non-negligible 
amount of packet drops and result in false alarms. Second, once a node is considered as 
untrustworthy or as an attacker, the existing trust-based routing mechanisms will not use 
this node any more. In the case of a false alarm, this will affect the routing performance. 
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Third, when a false alarm happens, a good node will be treated as an attacker or a node 
that goes down. This shortens the network lifetime as it is well-known that network’s 
lifetime is closely correlated to the time when the first node in the network goes down 
[31, 39, 40]. 
Our main idea to treat false alarms in a trust-based routing is to give these nodes a 
second chance. They will still be involved in routing (but their participation will have 
little or no impact on the routing performance) so their neighbors can continue to monitor 
their behavior and evaluate their trustworthiness. If their neighbors are convinced that 
false alarm has occurred, these nodes will be re-considered as good nodes and play their 
normal role in routing. However, if these nodes are confirmed to be insider attackers, 
they will be eliminated from the routing table just like the current trust-based routing 
algorithms. We call this mechanism False Alarm DEtection and Recovery, or FADER in 
short.  
The key contribution in FADER is that it allows a node to detect and correct (by 
recovery) its false alarm. Several questions need to be answered during the 
implementation of FADER: how to detect and recover all the false alarms quickly and 
cost effectively? how to ensure that an attacker will be detected as false alarm and 
recovered? how to satisfy the routing performance requirements such as packet delivery  
guarantees? how much can this help in routing performance and network lifetime? We 
will address these questions in the rest of this chapter.   
In the rest of this chapter, we first discuss the false alarm problem in the current 
trust-based routing and outline our FADER approach in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we 
answer the above questions by elaborating the technical details of FADER. We report our 
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OPNET simulation setup and simulation results in Section 4.4. We conclude in Section 
4.5.  
Finally, we mention that the simulation validation of our approach is based on a 
simple but popular trust model, namely the beta trust model, and a greedy routing 
protocol, GPSR. However, the discussion of the design of FADER is generic for any trust 
model and any touring protocols. That is, the proposed FADER approach can be 
combined with a trust-based routing protocol based on any trust model to improve the 
routing performance and network lifetime. 
 
4.2 False Alarm in Trust-based Routing 
4.2.1 Recap: Trust-based Routing 
We use the popular Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) as an example to 
show how a trust mechanism can help to detect and avoid inside attackers.  
 
Figure 4.1: GPSR (Solid lines) and trust-based GPSR (Dotted lines). When node 2 
drops many packets from node 3, a trust-based routing protocol will find a new 
routing path (Dotted lines) to avoid node 2. 
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Consider the WSN with 20 nodes shown in Figure 4.1. Node 3 relays the packets 
from nodes 4, 5, 9, 10, 15, and its own packets to node 2 who will then send them to the 
BS based on GPSR (depicted by solid lines with arrowhead). In a trust mechanism, node 3 
will use its watchdog to monitor node 2. 
When node 2 drops packets from node 3, node 3 will re-evaluate the trust value of 
node 2. If the trust value falls below the threshold value, node 3 will treat node 2 as an 
inside attacker. A trust-based routing protocol will then find a new routing path to avoid 
node 2. In this case, node 3 will forward the packets to node 7, hoping that node 7 will 
deliver the packets to the BS (the dotted lines with arrowheads in Figure 4.1). 
 
4.2.2 Existence of False Alarms in Trust Models 
As we have introduced in Section 2.5, the goal of a trust model is to provide a 
quantitative measurement of a node’s trustworthiness. In existing trust models, a 
monitoring node A evaluates its neighbor node B based on how reliably B forwards the 
packets it receives from A. Because A cannot tell whether a given packet is dropped by B 
due to a network problem or maliciously, A may mistakenly claim B as untrustworthy 
when there are sufficient natural packet drops that occur in B. There are several reasons 
for this: 
First, this may happen in a lossy network (or during the period when the network 
is lossy) when B drops many packets due to problems such as fading, noise, collision, 
congestion, or interference. These problems may be caused by network’s uncertain 
environment and thus become unpredictable.  
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Second, the attackers inside the network can intentionally create packet drops at 
victim nodes by means such as jamming.  
Third, with the desire of a high rate of detecting attackers, the trust threshold has 
to be set high. This comes at the cost of a high false alarm rate.  
 
4.2.3 Impact of False Alarms on Trust-based Routing and Network 
In current trust-based routing protocols, only trustworthy nodes are used for 
routing. Consider the same WSN in Figure 4.1. Node 3 considers node 2 untrustworthy 
and thus re-routes all its packets (as well as the packets from nodes 4, 5, 9, 10, and 15) to 
node 7. This will cause one or more of the following problems. When the network has a 
large number of false alarms, these problems can be critical to the network. 
1) Degraded routing performance: No matter what the objective of the routing 
protocol is, because its original choice (the false alarm node) is replaced, the new routing 
path will not be as good as the original one. For example, the transmission distance and 
energy on path 3→ 7→ BS can be higher than those on path 3→2→BS.  
2) Increased network traffic: Node 7 now has to relay the packets from additional 
6 nodes (3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 15) to the BS. This will increase the congestion, collision, and 
interference at node 7. 
3) Reduced lifetime: with the increased workload at node 7, it will consume its 
resource (particularly energy) quicker than in the original routing solution. This shortens 
the lifetime of node 7. Furthermore, when node 7 goes down, other nodes (such as nodes 
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6, 8, and 12 in Figure 4.1) have to route packets from node 3. This will reduce their 
lifetime and quickly the lifetime of the entire network.  
 
4.2.4 Overview of FADER  
Clearly, the above problems are mainly caused by the false alarms and the action 
that the trust-based routing protocol takes on false alarms. Now since there is no trust 
mechanism that can completely eliminate false alarms, we need to change the way we 
treat the false alarmed nodes.    
Recall that the existing trust mechanisms consider each node either trustworthy 
(T) of untrustworthy (U). A T-node B can become U-node if its trust value T[B] drops 
lower than the trust threshold TH. When this happens, the monitoring node A stops 
forwarding packets to B. Then, A stops monitoring it and updating its trust value. 
Therefore, a U-node cannot change to a T-node and be put back into a routing path. This 
can be summarized as a finite state machine (FSM) shown in Figure 4.2.   
 
Figure 4.2: The 2-state finite state machine representation of current trust models. In this 2-state 
finite state machine, a U-node cannot change to a T-node. 
 
From this FSM model, we see that if there is a false alarm U-node, we need an 
edge to transmit it back to a T-node. This is the basic concept behind our proposed False 
Alarm DEtection and Recovery (FADER) approach, where the key steps are outlined in 
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Figure 4.3. After node B’s trust value T[B] is below the trust threshold TH, a new 
trustworthy node C is found to replace B. However, unlike the current approach, FADER 
keeps A monitoring B and updating B’s trust value. This will provide the necessary data 
to determine whether B is an attacker or a false alarm. In the case of an attacker, A will 
permanently replace B by C in its routing table. In the case of a false alarm, A will use B 
again for routing and this is the way we make B a T-node which the current trust-based 
routing fails to do (see Figure 4.2). In the next section, we will elaborate in details of 
FADER, in particular with respect to the two shaded boxes in Figure 4.3: what data to 
collect and how to detect a false alarm. 
 
Figure 4.3: Outline of FADER: False Alarm DEtection and Recovery. 
T[B] ≥ TH ? 
Node A monitors node B and evaluates  
B’s trust value T[B] 
Yes 
No 
A replaces C with B 
A removes B from its routing table 





A finds a node C to replace B 
 
A monitors B and updates T[B] 
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4.3 False Alarm Detection and Recovery Mechanism  
In this section, we design a false alarm detection and recovery mechanism, which 
can be combined with existing trust models. We first design a 3-state trust mechanism 
with a recovery transition based on an FSM model, devise a trust re-evaluation method, 
and finally propose a multi-state trust mechanism with limited recovery chances that 
prevents malicious nodes from being recovered multiple times. 
 
4.3.1 3-state Trust Mechanism with a Recovery Transition 
 
Figure 4.4: 2-state trust mechanism with a recovery transition. A U-node can change to a T-
node unlimitedly when the recovery condition is satisfied. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: 3-state trust mechanism with a recovery transition. An S-node can change to  a T-
node, but a U-node cannot change to a T-node or a S-node. 
To recover a falsely detected node in the state U, we need an edge from the state 
U to the state S so that the state transition U  T can be performed when a pre-defined 
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condition for recovery is satisfied. The existing 2-state trust mechanism may not be 
suitable as a recovery mechanism. As shown in Figure 4.4, we may simply add a 
recovery transition from the state U to the state T. However, in this model, it is not clear 
how to prevent extremely untrustworthy nodes (such as inside attackers) from being 
recovered. To address this, instead of 2-state trust mechanism, we use 3-state trust 
mechanism by adding an intermediate state S (Suspicious) between the state T and the 
state U, as shown in Figure 4.5. In this 3-state model, only the S-node can be recovered 
when it satisfies a pre-defined condition for its recovery. However, once an S-node 
becomes a U-node, it can never be recovered because there are no transitions such as U 
 S or U  T. 
We explain our 3-state trust mechanism. First, we show how a monitoring node A 
classifies its neighbor node B into one of the three states (T, S, and U). Consider that A 
has been forwarding its data packets to B over the time t. A evaluates B’s trust value 
T[B](t) based on its direct observations on B’s packet forwarding behavior over t. Note 
that T[B] is measured by a trust model used in the network (e.g., by (2.5) when the beta 
trust model is used and by (2.7) when the entropy trust model is used). Given T[B], two 
trust thresholds are necessary to classify B into one of the three states (T, S, and U). Let 
TH1 be an upper trust threshold to separate two states T and S, and let TH2 be a lower 
trust threshold to separate two states S and U. Then, given T[B], TH1, and TH2, the state 






















Next, we explain how our 3-state trust mechanism works in each state transition 
between three states at the trust-based routing domain. As shown in Figure 4.5, we only 
use five state transitions as follows:  
1) T  T: When a T-node B’s trust value at A is equal to or higher than TH1, A 
continues to consider B as a trustworthy neighbor and forward its data packets to B.  
2) T  S: When a T-node B’s trust value goes below TH1, A considers B as an 
insider packet drop attacker, stops forwarding its data packets to B, and finds a 
trustworthy neighbor node C to forward its data packets to C. Meanwhile, based on our 
trust re-evaluation method that we will describe in the next section, A starts monitoring B 
to determine whether B is a falsely detected node (or a false alarm). 
3) S  U: When an S-node B’s trust value goes below TH2, A stops re-
evaluating B, and discards B from its routing table. That is, A never forwards its data 
packets to B again. 
4) S  T: When an S-node B’s trust value goes above TH1, A considers that B 
was falsely detected and recovers B to a T-node. A replaces C with B as a current next 
hop (see Figure 4.3) and starts forwarding its data packets to B again. Meanwhile, A 
stops forwarding its packets to C. This is because B was A’s original choice chosen by a 
base routing algorithm.  
5) S  S: When an S-node B’s trust value is between TH1 and TH2, A continues 
to consider B suspicious and re-evaluates B to determine whether it is a false alarmed 
node or not.  
Meanwhile, other unauthorized state transitions (such as U  T or U  S) must 
be prevented to avoid unauthorized recovery by malicious entities [55]. 
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4.3.2 Trust Re-evaluation Method 
Consider that node A wants to re-evaluate an S-node B to determine whether or 
not it is falsely detected. To do so, A needs some data that can be used for re-evaluating 
B’s trust value. Obviously, the most reliable data for trust re-evaluation are A’s direct 
observations on B’s packet forwarding behavior to data packets that A sent to B. 
However, in existing trust-based routing protocols, it is impossible for A to get such 
direct observations on B, because once B becomes a U-node in A’s trust mechanism, A 
never forwards its data packets to B. Instead of using direct observations on B, A may 
observe B’s packet forwarding behaviors to other nodes and re-evaluate B’s trust value 
based on the indirect observations. However, this approach is doubtable. Although B may 
forward another node C’s packets successfully, there is no guarantee that B will also 
forward A’s packets successfully. This is because the channel conditions between two 
different nodes are not identical.  
On the other hand, our approach is that A intermittently sends its duplicated data 
packets to B for trust re-evaluation. There are three reasons why we use this approach. 
First, by this approach, A can directly observe B’s packet forwarding behaviors to its own 
data packets and re-evaluate B’s trust value reliably based on its own observations. 
Second, even if B drops a duplicated data packet that A sent to B for trust re-evaluation, 
the original packet will be delivered to the BS via a trustworthy neighbor C. Thus, this 
approach ensures that the overall packet delivery performance will not be degraded due 
to our trust re-evaluation. Last, A intermittently sends data packets to B for false alarm 
detection, because this approach will increase the possibility to recover a falsely detected 
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node under temporal packet transmission failures. In addition, this approach will have 
less communication overhead.  
Based on this approach, we devise a simple trust re-evaluation method as follows. 
Whenever A starts re-evaluating B, A creates a random sequence R(n) that indicates 
which of its data packets should be duplicated and sent to B for trust re-evaluation. 
 
Figure 4.6: Our trust re-evaluation method based on a random sequence with s = 30 and i = 5. 
Node A will duplicate its 30th packet for the first time after node A detects node B as an 
untrustworthy node and send that packet to B for trust re-evaluation. After that, A will 
duplicate every fifth packet (35th, 40th, 45th, …) and send it to B until the trust re-evaluation is 
terminated. 
 
As shown in (4.2) below, we design R(n) by using two random functions S(s) and 
I(i) such that S(s) determines the first value s of R(n) and I(i) determines the interval i  
between two consecutive values of R(n). That is, i determines how frequently A will send 
a duplicated packet to B for trust re-evaluation; s and i are depicted in Figure 4.6.  
 ....,,2,1)1()(  nfornisnR  (4.2) 
The time node A 
detects node B
(T[B] < TH1)
Duplicated packets forwarded to node B 
for trust re-evaluation
t
5 28 294 31 32 33 34 3530 36 37 38 39 402 31
A
C
B s=30 i=5 ...
......





A simple way to design S(s) and I(i) is to use two uniform distributions. Before 
starting trust re-evaluation, A randomly chooses s in [s1, s2] and i in [i1, i2] where the 
parameters s1, s2, i1 and i2 are positive integers such that s1 < s2 and i1 < i2. For example, 
assuming that s and i are randomly chosen as s = 30 and i = 5, the generated random 
sequence R(n) = {5n + 25| n = 1, 2, …∞}. Then, as shown in Figure 4.6, based on R(n), A 
will duplicate its 30th packet for the first time after A detects B as an untrustworthy node 
and send that packet to B for trust re-evaluation. After that, A will duplicate every fifth 
packet (35th, 40th, 45th, …) and send it to B until the trust re-evaluation is terminated. In 
this method, the higher s and i are, the longer the trust evaluation period is.  
 
4.3.3 Limiting Recovery Chances  
In the 3-state trust mechanism, an S-node can be recovered to a T-node 
unlimitedly whenever its trust value goes above TH1 (see Figure 4.5). As a result, this 
scheme can be vulnerable to a malicious node that changes its attack patterns like an on-
off attacker. For this reason, we propose a multi-state trust mechanism that limits the 
number of recovery chances.  
To limit the number of recovery chances, we further divide the state S into two 
sub-states: SU (Suspicious and Untrustworthy) and ST (Suspicious but Trustworthy). 
Figure 4.7 shows an FSM diagram of our multi-state trust mechanism with two recovery 
chances. In this mechanism, the state S is divided into two SU states (SU1 and SU2) and 
two ST states (ST1 and ST2). Like the 3-state trust mechanism, a node can be considered 
for recovery only when it is in state SU (that is, either in SU1 or in SU2). However, 
unlike the 3-state trust mechanism, each node has only two chances to be recovered in 
 91 
 
this mechanism. For example, consider that node A is re-evaluating node B that is in state 
ST2 after spending two recovery chances. If B’s trust value T[B] goes below TH1 again, B 
finally goes to the state U where B is completely discarded by A as shown in Figure 4.7.   
 
Figure 4.7: The multi-state trust mechanism with two recovery chances (recovery chance r=2). 
For r recovery chances, we need r ST states and r SU states. The generalized 
restricted multi-state trust mechanism with i recovery chances is shown in Figure 4.8. 
Note that when the recovery chance r = ∞, such scheme will be the same with the 3-state 
trust mechanism without limiting recovery chances. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: The multi-state trust mechanism with i recovery chances (recovery chance r = i). 
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4.4 Performance Evaluation 
4.4.1 Simulation Goals, Setups, and Evaluation Metrics  
The goal of our simulations is to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
FADER approach. Specifically, we consider a WSN with inside packet drop attackers 
and compare the performance of three routing protocols: geographic routing protocol 
(GRP), trust-based GRP based on Beta trust model (Beta GRP), and FADER GRP. We 
also study the accuracy and effectiveness of FADER in detecting false alarms.  
We conduct simulations with the commercial network simulator OPNET Modeler 
under the following settings.  
 
Figure 4.9: The ad hoc WSN with two inside packet drop attackers used in our simulations. 
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WSN setting: an ad hoc WSN with 50 sensor nodes is built randomly in a 
1km×1km area as shown in Figure 4.9. We place the BS at one corner and every other 
sensor node will generate and send packets to BS. We use the default OPNET setting of 
data packet size (1KB) and GRP for routing. Each node generates a packet randomly 
within each 10-second period. We set the simulation time to be two hours (7,200 
seconds). At the start of the simulation, each node has 30J of energy. To simulate the 
packet drops in a lossy network, we randomly choose p% of the nodes and let them drop 
packets during the period of [100s, 400s].   
Attacker setting: we place two packet drop attackers near the BS. The attackers 
can launch any of the following attacks: blackhole attack (by dropping all the packets 
during the entire simulation period); grayhole attack (by randomly dropping each packet 
with a given probability); on-off attack (by repetitively dropping all packets for m 
seconds and then forwarding all packets for the next n seconds). In the last two cases, the 
drop rate is set to be higher than 1 – TH1 (otherwise, the trust mechanism will fail to 
detect the attackers).  
Trust model and FADER setting: The beta trust model as described in Section 
2.5.3 is used. A trust-based GRP is implemented. Each sensor node’s initial trust value is 
set to be 0.99. 0.8 is used as the trust threshold. The beta trust model may catch the two 
packet drop attackers as well as some of the p% of the nodes we selected to simulate 
lossy network. The latter ones will be false alarms. For FADER, 0.8 and 0.6 are used as 
TH1 and TH2, and the number of recovery chances is set to be two. FADER starts the 
trust re-evaluation after 30 redundant packets are sent to a node whose trust value falls 
below TH1, and repeats the re-evaluation for every fifth packet.   
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We compare GRP, trust-based Beta GRP, and our proposed FADER in terms of 
the following performance metrics: 
1) Network lifetime: we use two representative definitions of network lifetime: the 
simulation time when the packet delivery rate (PDR) drops dramatically (NL1), and the 
time when the first sensor node is drained of energy (NL2). A good routing protocol will 
give longer network lifetime.  
2) Routing performance: we measure both the number of hops of each path and 
the average number of hops per path (AH). A good routing protocol will have fewer long 
paths and a smaller AH. 
3) False alarm recovery rate: this is for FADER only. It measures FADER’s 
ability to detect and recover false alarms from the beta trust model. 
 
4.4.2 Simulation Results and Analysis 
4.4.2.1 Improvement of Network Lifetime 
 
Figure 4.10: Packet delivery rate under two blackhole attackers when p = 8%. From bottom to 
top around time t = 1,800s: GRP, Beta GRP, and FADER.  
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 Figure 4.10 reports the packet delivery rate (PDR) by three routing protocols for 
p=8%. In the case of GRP without any trust mechanism, all the packets that have an 
attacker on its routing path cannot reach the BS and thus it has a low PDR (slightly less 
than 0.6). At time around 4,824 seconds, sensor nodes start to run out of energy and the 
PDR drops dramatically from 0.6 to 0.3.  
With the help of trust mechanism, we see that the PDR can be improved 
significantly to be around 0.9 in the case of trust-based Beta GRP and very close to 1.0 in 
the case of FADER. The better PDR performance of FADER is a direct result of false 
alarm recovery. We can also see that FADER has a longer network lifetime compared to 
Beta GRP.  
The first node running out of energy happens (metric NL2) at time t = 3,162s for 
Beta GRP and t = 4,513s for FADER (see the last two columns of first row in Table 4.1). 
We can observe a very small drop in PDR because both routing protocols find alternate 
path to forward packets. However, as more and more nodes use their energy, routing 
paths become more and more difficult to find. Eventually, PDR drops dramatically when 
a critical node dies and no alternate path can be found (metric NL1: 4,536s for Beta GRP 
and 5,616s for FADER).   
Table 4.1 reports more detailed data on network lifetime measured in terms of 
both NL1 and NL2. It includes two networks settings with p=8% and p=12%; and three 
different types of attackers. As expected, with a larger p value, trust mechanism will have 
more false alarms which cause much shorter network lifetime for Beta GRP. With the 
false alarm detection and recovery feature, FADER improves NL1 by 82.9% under 
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blackhole and on-off attacks. For grayhole attack, which is widely considered as the most 
challenging attack, the improvement is 54.3%.  
 
Table 4.1: Network Lifetime (NL1 and NL2): NL1: the simulation time when the packet delivery rate 
(PDR) drops dramatically; NL2: the simulation time when the first sensor node is drained of energy. 
  NL1 NL2 
























































FADER consistently extends network lifetime in terms of NL2 by about 43% over 
Beta GRP. Recall NL2 is the time when the first node uses up its energy and becomes 
inactive. In FADER, when we recover false alarms, which are the first and original 
choice of GRP, these recovered nodes normally give us a better routing path which takes 
less energy and smaller hops, and yield less congestion and collision. We will analyze 
this feature of routing performance in more details next.  
 
4.4.2.2 Improvement of Routing Performance  
We compare the routing solutions provided by the trust-based Beta GRP and 
FADER. First, each routing protocol will find a path for each node to reach the BS. Table 
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4.2 reports the number of the k-hop paths for each protocol under different values of p 
when the attacker drops 80% of packets randomly (Grayhole(0.8)).   
 
Table 4.2: The number of k-hop paths in the routing solutions by Beta GRP and FADER when 
the attack type is Grayhole (0.8) 
 p=0% p=8% p=12% 
k Beta GRP Beta GRP FADER Beta GRP FADER 
1 4 3 3 4 4 
2 5 5 6 4 4 
3 10 5 7 4 8 
4 12 10 11 4 10 
5 9 14 13 11 9 
6 8 7 7 6 8 
7 1 (max) 3 1 (max) 8 6 (max) 
8 0 1 (max) 0 6 0 
9 0 0 0 2 (max) 0 
*∞ 0 1 1 0 0 
Total hops 192 209 194 253 211 
AH 3.91 4.27 3.95 5.16 4.30 
* k = ∞ means that the node cannot reach the BS. 
 
At the second column in Table 4.2, the number of k-hop paths by Beta GRP is 
given when p=0%. When p grows to 8 or 12%, we can see that the Beta GRP has longer 
k-hop paths and longer average hops than the Beta GRP when p = 0% because of 
increased false alarms.  
We see that FADER has the following advantages: 
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1) Fewer longer paths: when p=8%, Beta GRP has 4 paths of 7 hops or more, 
while FADER has only one 7-hop path. When p=12%, Beta GRP has 16 paths of 7 hops 
or more, while FADE has only six 7-hop paths.  
  2) Shorter longest path: the number of hops in the longest path is reduced by 1 
and 2 for p=8% and p=12%, respectively. 
  3) Smaller average hop per path: as shown in the last row, AH is reduced by 
7.5% and 16.7% for p=8% and p=12%, respectively. 
In addition, these features imply that FADER provides a routing solution that (1) 
is more energy efficient (smaller average hops per path); (2) has less delay (shorter 
longest path); and (3) will cause less congestion (fewer long paths). Moreover, in the 
presence of false alarms, we can see that FADER works similarly with the Beta GRP 
when p = 0% by detecting and recovering false alarms.  
 
4.4.2.3 False Alarm Recovery Performance  
Finally, we discuss FADER’s performance on detecting and recovering false 
alarms. First, we describe the metrics. Consider node 3 in Figure 4.1. It will receive 
packets from both nodes 4 and 9. Therefore, it will be monitored by both nodes 4 and 9. 
If node 3 is an inside attacker, a trust mechanism should enable both monitoring nodes to 
identify this.  
For attacker Ai, let vi be the number of victim nodes that directly forward packets 
to Ai; si be the number of nodes which successfully determine that Ai is an attacker; and ri 
be the number of nodes that have identified the attacker but then mistakenly consider the 
attacker as a good node by FADER.  Similarly, for each false alarm node FAi, we can 
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define fvi and fsi as well as fri which is the number of nodes that have generated a false 
alarm on node FAi, but are able to detect the false alarm and recover by FADER.  
Clearly, we want a trust mechanism to have si be the same as or as close as 
possible to vi (that is, all victim nodes will identify the attacker) and fsi be as small as 
possible (that is, fewer false alarms). When false alarms happen, we can measure 
FADER’s false alarm recovery performance by comparing the values of fri and fsi for 
each false alarm; and ri and si for each attacker. We define FADER’s recovery rate RR = 
 fri /  fsi where the sum is taken over all the false alarms.  
 
Table 4.3: False detection recovery performance: The results show that FADER is able to 
recover 60−70% of the false alarms without recovering any of the attackers in the 
presence of multiple attackers in lossy WSNs. 
 Attack 
Beta GRP FADER 
vi =si  fsi  ri  fri RR 
p=8% 
Blackhole 5 10 0 7 70.0% 
Grayhole(0.8) 5 10 0 7 70.0% 
On-off(80, 20) 5 10 0 7 70.0% 
p=12% 
Blackhole 5 14 0 10 71.4% 
Grayhole(0.8) 5 15 0 10 66.7% 
On-off(80, 20) 5 15 0 9 60.0% 
 
Table 4.3 reports the recovery performance of FADER. First we notice that the 
beta trust model is able to let all victims nodes identify the attack (vi =si), however, it 
does create a considerable amount of false alarms ( fsi), which is about 2-3 times of vi 
=si. This is the direct consequence of seeking for a high attacker identification rate. 
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With FADER, we see that it does not recover any attacker (ri=0 for all cases), while it 
successfully detects and recovers most of the false alarms ( fri) with at least 60% 
recovery rate in RR. 
Finally, we mention that FADER’s high false alarm recovery rate helps us to 
obtain the improvement of network lifetime and routing performance as analyzed earlier.  
 
4.5 Summary 
Trust-based routing is critical for WSNs when there may exist inside packet drop 
attackers. To ensure high PDR, it is desirable for a trust mechanism to catch all the inside 
attackers. However, high false alarms may cause significant degradation of network 
lifetime and routing performance. To our knowledge, FADER is the first attempt to 
address the false alarm problem in trust-based routing. We propose a false alarm 
detection and recovery (FADER) approach which enables us to identify and reuse these 
false alarmed nodes. Extensive OPNET simulations confirm that the FADER approach 
can dramatically improve network lifetime, package delivery rate, and the performance of 
the routing.  
There are several directions for future work. First and perhaps the most 
challenging question is how the inside attackers will respond to FADER. Because inside 
attackers are legal members of the network, they will know the details of the FADER and 
launch sophisticated attacks. Second, as we see in the results, FADER can recover about 
70% of the false alarms, and there is still room to improve the accuracy of FADER. 
Finally, it will be interesting to test FADER on more networks with more realistic noise 
model and other trust models.  
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Chapter 5  
Detection and Prevention of Selective Forwarding-based Denial-
of-Service Attacks  
 
5.1 Overview  
Selective forwarding attack, where the attacker drops only some packets and at 
some arbitrary time, is the most difficult insider packet drop attack to defend against [7]. 
Normally such an attacker seeks to achieve one of the following two goals. First, degrade 
the performance of the network in terms of packet loss rate. Second, prevent data 
collected by certain sensor nodes from reaching the BS. In the second case, the victim 
node will not be able to talk to the BS. We name this attack selective forwarding-based 
denial-of-service (DoS) attack. As we discussed in Section 2.3, most reported detection 
approaches on selective forwarding attacks focus on the detection of the attacker with the 
first goal, and thus they are not effective against selective forwarding-based DoS attacks 
[4, 9, 17, 18, 47, 50, 60].  Existing avoidance approaches based on multipath routing [7] 
or multiple topologies [5] introduce high communication overhead, and they are 
vulnerable to multiple attackers [4].   
As a motivation for the importance of studying selective forwarding-based DoS 
attacks, we consider a WSN deployed in a territory for intruder detection. With the help 
of insiders that perform the selective forwarding-based DoS attack, an intruder will be 
able to enter the territory from the area monitored by victim nodes (to the selective 
forwarding-based DoS attacks) without being noticed by the BS. When the intruder can 
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communicate with the inside attackers, they can launch the synchronized insider-outsider 
colluding DoS attack so the insider attackers can target different victims at different times 
and the intruder can explore the territory covered by the victim nodes only.  
In this chapter, we study the selective forwarding-based DoS attacks and propose 
effective detection and avoidance mechanisms as well as a prevention routing algorithm 
to defend against such attacks. Specifically, 
 we first describe a simple selective forwarding-based DoS attack and show 
that the popular trust-based approaches (such as beta and entropy trust mechanisms) for 
inside attacker detection fail to detect such attack. We also analyze the potential damage 
this attack can cause to the network. 
 we then propose a source-level trust evaluation scheme to enhance the 
beta and entropy trust mechanisms for effective detection of the selective forwarding-
based DoS attackers. Once the attacker is identified, we propose two avoidance strategies 
to re-route the victim’s packets so they can reach the BS. 
 we validate our claims and evaluate the performance of our detection and 
avoidance mechanisms with extensive OPNET simulations. 
 as a complementary defensive mechanism to our detection and avoidance 
methods, we also introduce a prevention routing algorithm to proactively prevent the 
selective forwarding-based DoS attacks and show our preliminary results to evaluate its 
performance. 
For simplicity, during the discussion of the threats and  detection of insider packet 
drop attacks, we do not consider natural packet drops caused by network problems. 
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However, our simulation settings include lossy networks and the natural packet drops due 
to network problems will be reported.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We first describe a selective 
forwarding-based DoS attack that none of the current defending approaches can detect to 
motivate our work in Section 5.2. We propose our detection and avoidance approaches in 
Section 5.3 and evaluate their performance in the packet routing domain in Section 5.4. 
In Section 5.5, as a complementary defensive mechanism to our detection and avoidance 
methods, we introduce a prevention routing algorithm where an attacker has to choose 
between “not attacking” and “attacking and being caught”. We summarize in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2 A Selective Forwarding-based DoS Attack and Its Analysis 
1) Motivation: the current trust mechanisms and trust-based routing cannot detect 
all known insider packet drop attacks. For instance, an intelligent attacker who can keep 
its trust value above the threshold value ΘT will not be detected. More weakness can be 
found in literature such as [35]. Our proposed selective forwarding-based DoS attack 
comes from the following simple observation:  
To attack victims and avoid being identified, the attacker node A will have to 
disguise itself by forwarding packets for some nodes. When a node M sends only its own 
packets to the attacker A and uses its watchdog to monitor A, apparently A cannot drop 
all the packets without being detected. However, if M also forwards packets from other 





Figure 5.1: Trust-based GPSR in the presence of a selective forwarding-based DoS attacker (node 2).  
 
For example, in the WSN shown in Figure 5.1 where all the nodes generate 
packets with the same frequency and send them to the BS, node 2 can pick node 10 as its 
victim and drops all the packets from node 10. Therefore the BS can never hear messages 
from node 10 and hence comes the name “denial of service” for this attack. However, if 
node 2 forwards all the packets from nodes 3, 4, 5, 9, and 15 to the BS, when Beta trust 
model is used with ΘT =0.70, the monitoring node 3 will hear node 2 forwarding 5/6  
83% of the packets and fails to identify node 2 as an attacker because node 2’s trust value 
will be approximately 0.83, higher than the threshold ΘT =0.70. 
It is not hard to see that once an attacker position itself on the routing path of 
many nodes, it can select multiple victim nodes and launch the denial of service attack 
without being noticed. This can easily cause a lot of damage to the network and so we 
need to find countermeasures to defeat such attack.   
2) Protocol of the attack: the following steps define the protocol for an inside 
attacker A to launch the selective forwarding-based DoS attacks against multiple victim 
nodes: 
2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10








1. for each node M that forwards packets directly to A and monitors A with 
its watchdog,   kM =0; nM=0; 
2. while (both the network and node A are on) { 
3. on the reception of a packet { 
4.   identify the node M that forwards the message;  
5.   identify the source node S that generates the packet;  
6.   if S is a victim node, drop the packet; 
7.   if S is a non-victim source node, forward the packet;   
8.   if S is a new source node { 
9.      nM++; 
10.      if nM = V[kM] { 
11.          pick a new victim source node;  
12.          kM ++;  
13.          if S is the new victim node, drop the packet; 
14.          else forward the packet;        
     } 
  } 
        } 
      } 
On each received packet (step 3), the attacker A first determines the direct sender 
of the message (node M) and original source node S that generates the packet (steps 4 and 
5). If A has received packets from S before (that is, S is not a new source node), A will 
either drop or forward the packet based on whether S is a victim or not (steps 6 and 7). If 
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S is a new source node, A will update the number of nodes whose packets are routed to A 
through M by nM++ (step 9). When nM reaches a pre-determined value, A will be able to 
select a new victim to launch the DoS attack (steps 10-14). We called this attack selective 
forwarding-based DoS because the attacker can selectively choose the victims and drop 
all the packets from the victims to mislead the BS to consider the victim nodes are either 
out of service or disconnected.   
3) Analysis of the attack: for an inside attacker to launch the selective forwarding-
based DoS attack against the victim nodes, the attacker needs to (i) be able to tell whether 
a received packet is from the victim nodes, and (ii) ensure that after dropping all the 
packets from the victim nodes, the attacker will not be detected by the monitoring nodes.   
We first show that assumption (i) is valid. In a geographic routing employed 
WSN, the receiver of a packet can obtain the source node (the node that creates the 
packet) information from the packet, because the receiver is a legitimate relay node that 
can access the packet’s header where the source identification is stored [8, 69]. Even 
when the source node is protected by methods such as authorization, it is still possible for 
a malicious receiver to figure out the source node information by breaking the 
authorization mechanism or analyzing network traffics [36, 37].  
Second, we will show requirement (ii) can be satisfied. Because the inside 
attacker is a legitimate member of the WSN, it knows the trust model and the threshold 
value ΘT used in the network. In a well-defined trust mechanism, when a node’s packet 
drop rate increases, its trust value should not increase. A node will be considered as 
trustworthy if its trust value is above the threshold. Therefore, an attacker can evaluate its 
own trust value and drop a packet only when a drop will not bring its trust value below 
 107 
 
the threshold ΘT. In our proposed protocol, the attacker selects a victim only when there 
are enough non-victim source nodes to keep the attacker’s trust value above ΘT. This is 
guaranteed by the carefully determined array V[.] used in step 10 as we will explain next.  
We define V[j] as the minimum number of source nodes whose packets are routed 
to the attacker (A) through the same monitoring node (M) such that the attacker can drop 
packets from j+1 of these nodes without being detected by M. That is, V[0] is the 
minimum number of nodes for attacker A to cover/disguise the first victim;  V[1] is the 
minimum number of nodes for A to attack two victims. 
In the beta trust model, if attacker A attacks (j+1) victims among V[j] nodes and 












To keep this trust value higher or equal to the trust threshold ΘT, we can easily 
















For the entropy trust models, there is no closed formula for V[j]. However, we can 
compute V[j] numerically for any given ΘT. Table 5.1 lists the values of V[j] for the three 
different trust models where 0.70 is used as the trust threshold ΘT.   
 
Table 5.1: Values of V[j] for three trust models when ΘT = 0.70 
V[j] V[0] V[1] V[2] V[3] V[4] V[5] 
TBeta 4 7 10 14 17 20 
TEntr 19 38 57 76 94 113 





The small values of V[0] indicate that the proposed selective forwarding-based 
DoS attack is a very serious threat. For the attacker (A) to launch the attack against a 
specific victim (V), it only requires the node (M) that forwards V’s packets to A also 
forwards packets from 2 other nodes to A in the beta trust model (V[0] = 4: M, V, and 2 
other nodes). 
One can also see that V[j] has a much larger value for the entropy trust models 
than the beta trust model. This is because earning a high trust value in entropy trust 
models (2.7) and (2.8) is much harder (that is, a node must have very few packet drops) 
than earning a high trust value in the beta trust model (2.5). 
 
5.3 The Proposed Defensive Mechanism 
In this section, we propose and analyze our defensive mechanism, which is an 
enhancement of the beta and entropy trust mechanisms, against the above selective 
forwarding-based DoS attack. This defensive mechanism consists of two phrases: 
attacker detection and attacker-aware re-routing, which will be elaborated in subsections 
5.3.1 and 5.3.2 of this section, respectively. We analyze our approach and compare with 
existing methods in subsection 5.3.3.  
 
5.3.1 Source-level Trust Evaluation and Attacker Detection 
As depicted in Figure 5.2(a), in the existing trust mechanism [6, 10, 12, 22, 25, 71, 72, 
74], a monitoring node M counts the number of successes s and failures f that the next 
node A forwards packets from M. It then evaluates the trust value T[A] of A based on s 
and f using the  trust model adopted by the network. If T[A] < ΘT, M will consider A as 
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an inside attacker. However, we have seen that this mechanism fails to detect intelligent 
attackers such as those launching the selective forwarding-based DoS attacks. For 
example, attacker A can drop all packets from node 1, but forwards packets from all other 
non-victim nodes (in this case, nodes 2, 3, and M) to keep its trust value T[A] high. When 
T[A] ≥ ΘT, A’s malicious attacking behavior will not be detected by M. 
 
(a) Existing approach (b) Source-level trust evaluation 
Figure 5.2: Existing trust evaluation approach and proposed approach. In our approach (source-
level trust evaluation), M evaluates not only A’s overall trust value T[A] but also A’s source-level 
trust values Ti[A] to see how much M can trust A in forwarding packets from node i. 
 
We can see that the current trust mechanism fails because the attacker can hide its 
malicious behavior behind its good behaviors. As an attacker can identify the source node 
of a packet to launch the selective forwarding-based DoS attack, a monitoring node can 
also utilize the source node information to defend against such attack. This leads us to the 
following idea. If M uses separate counters to track not only A’s overall packet 









































then M will be able to tell whether A has launched the DoS attack against any node. This 
is shown in Figure 5.2(b) where M also evaluates A’s trust value Ti[A] for each source 
node i. We refer to this approach as source-level trust evaluation and it can be easily 
integrated into the current 3-stage trust mechanism to improve its effectiveness of 
detecting inside attackers as follows: 
1) Neighbor behavior monitoring: In addition to recording A’s overall behavior s 
and f, for each packet that M overhears A is forwarding, M checks the source node 
information and updates a pair of separate counters, si and fi, where i is the source node of 
the packet, to keep tracking the number of successes and failures for packets that A 
forwards from source node i, according to A’s packet forwarding behaviors to node i.  
2) Trust measurement: Based on the data collected in the first stage, M evaluates 
not only A’s overall trust value T[A] based on s and f, but also its source-level trust values 
Ti[A] based on (si, fi) to see how much M can trust A in forwarding packets from node i. 
When the beta trust model is used, A’s source-level trust value for source node i,          













AT  (5.1) 
When the entropy trust model is used, A’s source-level trust value for source node 
















AT  (5.2) 
where H(pi)=−pilog2pi−(1−pi)log2(1−pi) and pi=(si+1)/(si+fi+2). To have a non-
















  (5.3) 
3) Attack Detection: If any trust value Ti[A] goes below the pre-determined trust 
threshold, M detects that A is a selective forwarding attacker against node i, the victim of 
such attack. When the overall trust value T[A] of node A goes below the trust threshold 
ΘT, A will be considered as an inside packet drop attacker just like the current trust 
mechanism will do.  
 
Theorem 5.1. The proposed source-level trust evaluation approach can 
successfully detect selective forwarding-based DoS attacks against any source node. 
 
Proof. By the definition of the selective forwarding-based DoS attack, if A 
launches attack against node i, it will behave like a blackhole attacker and drop all 
packets originated from node i. Hence, after the attack is launched, si will remain 
unchanged and fi will increase by one whenever a packet from node i is dropped by 
attacker A. When node i generates sufficient number of packets, the packet drop rate      
α= fi /(si+fi) will increase and can be arbitrarily close to 1. This means that A’s trust value 
with respect to node i, Ti[A], will approach to the minimum trust value, which will be 
way below the trust threshold ΘT. So the monitoring node M will be able to identify this 
DoS attack and its victim.  
Formally, let ni = si + fi be the total packets generated by a victim node i, this 













Because all the (si, fi) pairs are kept independently, the selective forwarding-based 
DoS attack against any other source nodes can also be detected, depending on how fast 
the victim nodes generate packets.                                                                                      ■ 
 
Our approach requires the number of delivery successes and failures for packets 
from each source node. This will introduce storage overhead. Fortunately, such overhead 
is negligible. Even in the case when a node is receiving packets from 100 different source 
nodes and wants to track the status of the last 1 million packets from each node, the 
memory requirements will only be 0.25KB (=100×log22
20
 bits/8). This overhead is low 
for current sensors such as TelosB (10KB RAM, 48KB Flash, and 1MB EEPROM) and 
Mica2/MicaZ (4KB RAM, 128KB Flash, 512KB EEPROM) [38].   
 
5.3.2 Attacker-aware Avoidance Routing Strategies 
Once the attacker and a victim of the selective forwarding-based DoS attack are 
detected, approaches to re-route the victim’s packet to the BS should be developed. In 
this section, we propose two attacker-aware re-routing algorithms, which we refer to as 
avoidance strategies.  
When the value of a Ti[A] becomes less than the network’s trust threshold ΘT, the 
monitoring node M will conclude that A is an inside attacker attacking node i. To avoid 
further damage that A may make to the network, M can use a complete avoidance (CA) 
strategy to re-route all the packets to another trustworthy neighbor node (such as B shown 
in Figure 5.3(a)). This ensures that all the packets received by M, not only those from 
node i, will avoid the attacker A. However, this strategy will increase the traffic on node 
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B and may also introduce other routing overhead. For example, if node A was the best 
choice in an energy efficient routing algorithm, re-routing all the packets to node B 
instead of A will cause increase in energy consumption. Furthermore, if A targets 
multiple victims, this strategy will help all of the victims to avoid the attacker A, but it 
can only identify the first victim. Finally, assuming that node A is a good node, if M 
mistakenly claims the first victim, A will be treated as an attacker. This will increase the 
false alarm rate in finding inside packet drop attackers.     
 
 (a) Complete avoidance (CA)  (b) Selective avoidance (SA) 
Figure 5.3: Two avoidance strategies to re-route the victim’s packets to BS: CA: Complete 
Avoidance; SA: Selective Avoidance. 
 
In light of the fact that a selective forwarding-based DoS attacker (node A in this 
case) has targeted victims, the selective avoidance (SA) strategy will only re-route the 
discovered victim’s packets to avoid the attacker A and keep the other packets running 






























trust values (Ti[A]) for all nodes except those discovered victims. So even when the 
attacker targets multiple victims, the SA strategy can discover all of them and help them 
to avoid the attacker. This strategy will effectively solve CA’s resource overhead 
problem. Its drawback is that it will take time for each of the victims to be identified and 
the attacker can still drop packets from the victims and do damage to the network until all 
the victims are discovered.   
We summarize the features of the two proposed attacker-aware re-routing 
algorithms in the following table:  
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of the two proposed avoidance strategies (CA: Complete Avoidance; SA: 
Selective Avoidance) 
 CA SA 
re-route victim’s packets Yes Yes 
re-route non-victim’s packets Yes No 
time to re-route all victims’ packets Short Long 
discover multiple victims No Yes 
probability of false alarm on attacker Large Small 
impact on the original routing solution Large Small 
 
5.3.3 Analysis of the Proposed Defensive Mechanism  
The proposed defensive mechanism follows the 2-phase detection-avoidance 
framework. In the first phase, the source-level trust evaluation approach will detect 
victims of the selective forwarding-based DoS attack. In the second phase, the attacker-




5.3.3.1 Comparison with the Existing Trust Mechanisms 
Our source-level trust evaluation is an enhancement of the existing trust-based 
mechanisms for inside attacker detection [6, 12]. The difference is that existing 
approaches do not consider the packet forwarding behavior of the receiving node (the 
node being monitored) for each individual source node. Therefore, it can detect whether 
the node is an inside packet drop attacker, but it will fail to detect the proposed selective 
forwarding-based DoS attack. In our proposed method, the monitoring node will evaluate 
the trust value with respect to each source node. As stated in Theorem 5.1, this 
enhancement enables us to identify not only the attacker, but also all the victims. The cost 
of our approach, compared with existing mechanisms, is the storage requirement to keep 
the delivery information for each source node, which we have analyzed after the proof of 
Theorem 5.1.    
Now we compare the false alarm rate (FAR) of our approach with existing 
mechanisms. FAR measures how likely a good node will be tagged as an inside attacker. 
Let FAR, FARCA, and FARSA be the FAR of the existing detection approach, our 
approach with CA, and our approach with SA, respectively. We have 
 
Theorem 5.2. FARCA  FAR  FARSA. 
 
Proof. Recall that the trust value T[A] in the existing trust mechanism is defined 
based on the packet drop rate, which is the ratio of the total failures (f) over the total 
number of packets (s+f). A false alarm occurs when a good node’s trust value T[A] 
becomes smaller than the trust threshold ΘT. In our approach, the monitoring node M also 
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updates Ti[A], the trust value with respect to source node i, which is determined by the 
drop rate of packets from node i or the pair of (si, fi).  
When we use CA strategy in the second phase, the first detected victim node j is 
the one that has the largest packet drop rate that results in the smallest Ti [A] among all 
the node i’s that send their packets to A through the same monitoring node M. That is,  
Tj[A] = min {Ti[A]}. For the same set of node i’s, we have s=si and f=fi. Clearly, T[A] 
 Tj[A]. Therefore, when the existing detection mechanism claims (regardless the 
correctness of the claim) node A as an attacker, (that is, T[A]<ΘT), our approach should 
have already identified the first victim j of A’s DoS attack because  
Tj[A] ≤ T[A] < ΘT. 
However, when our approach claims an attacker, Tj[A] < ΘT, it is not necessarily 
true that T[A] < ΘT. A false alarm is an incorrect claim. So FARCA  FAR. 
On the other hand, when SA strategy is applied, our approach will identify the 
DoS victims one by one and re-route the packets from these victims to nodes other than 
the attacker A. Note that victim nodes always have large packet drop rate, when their 
packets are re-routed, the trust value of A evaluated by our approach will be higher than 
that in the existing approach. This is because the existing approach will count the (si, fi) 
pairs from these victims in s=si, f=fi in the calculation of T[A]. So when the same ΘT 
is used, T[A] < ΘT will always first happen in the existing approach before it happens in 






5.3.3.2 Comparison with the Avoidance Approaches  
As we have mentioned in the introduction, the idea behind current avoidance 
approaches is to send packets from multiple disjoint paths in order to avoid inside packet 
drop attackers [5, 7, 58, 59]. These approaches cannot and are not intended to detect the 
attackers. We have also discussed in Chapter 2 that the overhead of such avoidance 
approaches can be prohibitively high. For example, when each packet is sent through 
multiple different paths, the transmission energy, the network traffic, and collision will 
all increase dramatically.  
Despite the same name, the avoidance strategy in the second phase of our 
defensive mechanism is conceptually different from the above avoidance approaches. In 
our approach, the avoidance strategy is applied after both the victims and the attacker in 
the insider packet drop attack have been identified. Therefore we can efficiently find a 
path that does not involve the attacker to deliver victim’s packets to the BS. Although the 
new path may not be as good as the initial path (where the attacker sits on) in terms of 
energy, delay, or channel quality, neither CA nor SA uses multiple paths. Hence, the 
large overhead problem in the conventional avoidance approaches does not exist in our 
defensive mechanism.   
 
5.4 Simulation and Results Analysis 
5.4.1 Simulation Goals, Setups, and Evaluation Metrics  
There are two main goals of the simulation: validating that the current trust 
mechanisms fail to detect the proposed DoS attack; evaluating the performance of our 
defensive approach.  
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The parameters in Table 5.3 are used in our simulations. We conduct simulations 
with the commercial network simulator OPNET Wireless Modeler v.17.1. 100 sensors 
are deployed in a 2km×2km area randomly in one setting (Figure 5.4(a)) and in a 10×10 
grid in another setting (Figure 5.4(b)). Each sensor node except the BS generates a packet 
randomly in each 10-second period. The packets are sent to the BS. We use some of the 
default settings in OPNET such as 1024-bit data packet and Geographic Routing Protocol 
(GRP) with a maximum of seven retransmissions before ACK is received. We set each 
node’s initial trust value to be 0.99. We consider the cases of both single and multiple 
selective forwarding-based DoS attackers. The simulation time is set to be 30 minutes in 
the case of single attacker and 40 minutes for multiple attackers. We simulate the 
attacker(s) launch the proposed selective forwarding-based DoS attack to various 
numbers of victims. Both beta and entropy trust models (defined in equations (2.5) and 
(2.8)) as well as our enhanced trust mechanism (defined in equations (5.1) and (5.3)) with 
two avoidance strategies (CA and SA) are implemented in the OPNET Modeler for 




Table 5.3: OPNET simulation setup parameters 
Parameters Setting 
General 
Terrain dimension 2km × 2km 
Number of nodes 100 
Topology Random/ Grid 
Max. simulation time 
30 mins for single attacker; 
40 mins for multiple attackers 
Base routing algorithm GRP 
Max. retransmissions 7 (OPNET default) 
Data packet 
Generation 
Start time – Stop time 100 seconds – end of simulation 
Destination Base station 
Packet arrival interval Every 10 second 
Packet size 1,024 bits 
Trust model 
Type 
Beta trust model and 
Entropy trust model 
Initial trust value 0.99 
Trust threshold (ΘT) 0.7 
Attack model 
Number of attackers 
Single attacker and 
Mulitple attackers (=2) 







(a) Random topology 
(b) Grid topology 
Figure 5.4: Two WSN topologies in our simulations. One hundred sensors are deployed in a 
2km×2km area randomly in one setting (a) and in a 10×10 grid in another setting (b). 
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The main performance evaluation metrics are as follows: 
1) Avoidance completion time (ACT): this is the time when all the victims have 
been re-routed to avoid the attacker. 
2) False alarm rate (FAR): as discussed in the previous section, this is the 
probability that a good node is being considered as a selective forwarding-based DoS 
attacker. 
3) Energy per packet (EPP): this is the average energy consumption to deliver a 
packet, regardless of whether the packet reaches the BS or not.  EPP is obtained by the 
total energy consumed for data packet transmissions divided by the total number of data 
packets generated by all source nodes. 
 
5.4.2 Simulation Results and Analysis of Single Attacker 
ACT is the most important metric as it indicates the ability of each approach in 
identifying the attacker and re-routing the victim’s packets. The simulation results on 
ACT in Table 5.4 reveal the followings:  
1) Beta or entropy trust models alone fail to detect the attacker: In the grid 
topology, there are 21 source nodes that send packets to the monitoring node and then to 
the attacker. From Table 5.1, when the selective forwarding-based DoS attacker targets 6 
victims or less, the beta trust model will not detect it; when it targets 3 victims or less, the 
entropy trust model cannot detect it. The results in Table 5.4 confirm this. This is also 
true for the random topology where the monitoring node forwards packets from 16 source 
nodes (including itself) to the attacker. 
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 2) Our defensive mechanisms successfully detect the victims: Even when the 
attacker targets only one victim (the case of J=1), our defensive mechanism can help both 
the beta and entropy models to identify the victim node. The entropy model is quicker 
because a dropped packet will cause more reduction in the trust value in entropy model. It 
also takes a little more time for the SA strategy because it finds victims one by one.  
3) Optimality of the proposed selective forwarding-based DoS attack: We already 
discussed in 1) that our proposed selective forwarding-based DoS attack cannot be 
detected by the current trust model. Table 5.4 also shows that if the attacker becomes 
aggressive and targets more victims than the V[j] values in Table 5.1 allow, then they will 
be detected by the existing approaches (both the beta model and the entropy model). 
 
Table 5.4: Avoidance completion time ACT (in seconds): Top: Grid topology; Bottom: Random 
topology; CA: Complete Avoidance; SA: Selective Avoidance; J: Number of victim nodes. 
 GRID TOPOLOGY 
J 
Beta trust model Entropy trust model 
Pure CA SA Pure CA SA 
1 Fail 542.5 542.5 Fail 269.0 269.0 
2 Fail 539.0 551.5 Fail 266.0 279.5 
3 Fail 538.5 552.0 Fail 268.0 278.5 
4 Fail 538.0 553.5 255.5 255.5 255.5 
5 Fail 543.0 562.5 184.5 184.5 184.5 
6 Fail 541.5 552.5 152.5 152.5 152.5 
7 581.0 541.5 561.0 151.5 151.5 151.5 
 RANDOM TOPOLOGY 
1 Fail 548.3 548.3 Fail 277.2 277.2 
2 Fail 546.9 604.6 Fail 289.0 300.9 
3 Fail 553.2 644.8 360.9 278.6 329.7 
4 Fail 559.0 602.0 204.7 204.7 204.7 
5 802.5 549.5 591.3 162.4 162.4 162.4 
6 352.6 352.6 352.6 153.2 153.2 153.2 
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FAR measures the likelihood an approach will mistakenly treat an honest node as 
attacker. In the grid topology, there are very few collisions and there is no false alarm. 
The FAR values for different approaches in the random topology are shown in Table 5.5. 
This result confirms the claim of FARCA  FAR  FARSA we made in Theorem 5.2.  
 
Table 5.5: False alarm rate FAR in the random topology. The result shows FARCA ≥ FAR ≥ FARSA. 
J 
Beta trust model Entropy trust model 
Pure CA SA Pure CA SA 
1 0.010 0.036 0.010 0.048 0.069 0.048 
2 0.010 0.034 0.010 0.045 0.067 0.044 
3 0.011 0.033 0.010 0.065 0.065 0.046 
4 0.011 0.031 0.010 0.064 0.064 0.064 
5 0.031 0.035 0.010 0.061 0.061 0.061 
6 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.061 0.061 0.061 
 
Finally, we report EPP. From Table 5.6, we can see that our proposed 
enhancement incurs very little energy overhead. In the avoidance approach where 
multiple paths are used, for a single attacker, two disjoint paths will guarantee the 
successful avoidance of the attacker. However, the energy consumption will be doubled. 







Table 5.6: Energy per packet EPP (mJ): Top: Grid topology; Bottom: Random topology; CA: 
Complete Avoidance; SA: Selective Avoidance; J: Number of victim nodes. 
GRID TOPOLOGY 
J 





CA SA CA SA 
1 37.53 3.65 0.40 37.53 4.42 0.51 
2 37.42 3.87 0.77 37.42 4.73 0.99 
3 37.27 4.19 1.23 37.27 5.12 1.50 
4 37.14 4.52 1.67 39.19 0 0 
5 37.03 4.70 2.05 39.25 0 0 
6 36.89 5.04 2.49 39.32 0 0 
7 38.65 0.13 -2.07 39.3 0 0 
RANDOM TOPOLOGY 
1 78.14 1.10 0.44 78.40 1.38 0.54 
2 77.56 1.55 0.98 77.74 2.14 1.40 
3 76.96 2.27 1.68 79.23 0.06 -0.67 
4 76.42 3.01 2.30 79.55 0 0 
5 78.08 0.54 0.09 79.70 0 0 
6 79.01 0 0 79.51 0 0 
 
In a couple of cases, when SA strategy is used, there is actually a small amount of 
energy savings. This is possible because the original geographical routing protocol does 
not guarantee energy efficiency. Moreover, as we have analyzed, SA strategy uses less 
energy than CA strategy because in SA strategy, only packets from detected victims will 
be re-routed.  
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5.4.3 Simulation of Multiple Attackers 
For simplicity, we report the case of two attackers. When the two attackers are far 
away from each other, launching attacks to victim nodes independently, the result for 
each attack is almost identical to the single attacker case. Here we discuss the more 
interesting case when the two attackers are physically close to each other, for example, 
when the node to the right of the attacker in Figure 5.4(b) is also an attacker and they 
both target the same set of victims.  
As one can imagine, when a victim node is identified, either the CA or the SA 
strategy will try to re-route packets to avoid the attacker. However, because the attacker’s 
neighbor is also an attacker, if the monitoring node happens to choose the second attacker 
to forward packets to, both ACT and EPP will increase. In particular, the ACT will be 
around doubled because it will take about the same amount of time for the monitoring 
node to recognize the second attacker and re-route again. We now study the simulation 
results below: 
First, we see that the two attackers together can target more victims without being 
detected. For example, in Table 5.4, we know that a single attacker will be detected by 
the pure beta trust model (without our defensive mechanism) if it attempts to attack 7 or 
more victims. However, Table 5.7 shows that the pure beta trust model can find the two 
attackers only when they are trying to attack 9 or more victims, which apparently 
indicates the improvement of attacking power.  
Second, we see that the ACT is about tripled, instead of doubled, of the ACT in 
the single attack model. This is a little unexpected. However, the topology of the network 
and the position of the attackers are the main reason for this. In our case, when the 
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monitoring node finds the second attacker, it will re-route the packets to a new node. The 
new node happens to forward the packets to the second attacker again, thus it will take 
again time for the new node to identify the second attacker. This results in the ACT in the 
2-adjacent attackers case is about three times of the ACT for single attacker. 
 
Table 5.7: Avoidance completion time ACT (in seconds) in the case of multiple attackers               
in the grid topology 
J 
Beta trust model Entropy trust model 
Pure CA SA Pure CA SA 
1 Fail 1,896.6 1,895.3 Fail 805.3 807.3 
2 Fail 1,876.6 1,447.3 Fail 780.6 632.0 
3 Fail 1,862.6 1,306.6 Fail 772.6 574.6 
4 Fail 1,861.3 1,230.0 8,750 742.6 624.6 
5 Fail 1,869.3 1,189.3 617.3 563.3 475.3 
6 Fail 1,866.6 1,158.0 372.0 372.0 372.0 
7 Fail 1,864.0 1,137.3 298.0 298.0 298.0 
8 Fail 1,374.0 999.3 248.6 248.6 248.6 
9 1,438.3 1,092.6 835.3 215.3 215.3 215.3 






5.5 Prevention Routing Algorithm  
5.5.1 Motivation and Key Idea 
As we discussed earlier, when an inside attacker relays packets for many sensor 
nodes in the network, it can pick one or more victims to launch the selective forwarding-
based DoS attack. This is because it can hide its malicious behavior by forwarding 
packets from other nodes and maintaining a high trust value. If an attacker is on the 
routing path of only one or two nodes and it attacks a victim, the chance that the attacker 
will be detected quickly is high. In such a situation, the attacker may not take the risk to 
launch any attack. Based on this observation, we propose a prevention routing algorithm 
where an attacker has to choose between “not attacking” and “attacking and being 
caught”. This is complementary to the detection and avoidance approach we described 
earlier. They can be used together as a more effective defensive mechanism.        
The key idea of our prevention method is to limit the number of source nodes 
(NSMAX) from which a node receives packets through the same monitoring node. As 
discussed in Section 5.2.2, if the attacker receives data packets from at least V[0] source 
nodes from a monitoring node, it can launch the selective forwarding-based DoS attack 
against one of the source nodes without being detected by the monitoring node. 
Therefore, in our prevention method, we require that each monitoring node forwards 
packets from at most V[0] – 1 source nodes, that is NSMAX = V[0] – 1. This will prevent the 
attacker from launching the selective forwarding-based DoS attack. If the attacker still 
launches the attack, it will be detected by the monitoring node.  
Figure 5.5 shows how our prevention method successfully defends against a 
selective forwarding-based DoS attacker N1. Consider the beta trust model with the trust 
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threshold ΘT = 0.7 is used in a WSN. Node M receives packets from 8 nodes (nodes 1 to 
8). Assume that N1 is the best neighbor of M and N2 is the next best choice of M to 
forward its packets to the BS. Although node N1 is M’s best choice to relay the packets, 
our prevention routing algorithm will limit M to forward packets from only 3 nodes 
(nodes M, 6, and 7 in this case) to N1 because V[0] = 4 (see Table 5.1) and thus NSMAX = 
3.  Packets from the other 6 nodes will be forwarded to nodes N2 and N3, three each.  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Our prevention routing algorithm against a selective forwarding-based DoS attacker 
(node N1) when the beta trust model is used with ΘT = 0.7. 
 
The attacker N1 cannot launch the selective forwarding-based DoS attack against 
any of the three source nodes (M, 6, and 7) without being detected by M. If N1 starts 
attacking any of the three source nodes, N1’s trust value evaluated by M will be 0.67 







































































5.5.2 Proposed Prevention Routing Algorithm 
Our prevention method can be easily integrated into any existing trust-based 
routing algorithm. Figure 5.6 shows the flow chart of a trust-based routing algorithm with 
our prevention method. Each time node M wants to forward a data packet toward the BS 
(regardless of its own packet or packets it receives from other nodes), M first checks the 
source node of the data packet and then finds a neighbor node A at M’s Source-Neighbor 
Mapping Table (SNMT). SNMT is a lookup table that tells M which of M’s neighbors 
will receive a certain source node’s data packet to forward the packet toward the BS. If 
such node A is found at the SNMT for the source node, M will forward the packet to A. 
Otherwise, M will find a new neighbor node B such that the number of source nodes 
assigned to B is less than NSMAX. If there are multiple neighbors satisfying such condition, 
the next hop selection algorithm of a base routing algorithm such as GPSR will choose 
the best one among them. If such node B is found, M registers B to its SNMT for the 
source node and then forwards the data packet to B. If M cannot find any neighbor 
satisfying such condition, M forwards the source’s data packet back to the previous node 



























Figure 5.6: The flow chart of a trust-based routing algorithm with our prevention method to 
prevent the selective forwarding-based DoS attack. 
 
Node M receives a packet from node P 
M checks the source of the packet 
M finds a designated neighbor node A 
for the source node at M’s Source-
Neighbor Mapping Table (SNMP) 
Such A is found? 
M finds a neighbor B that can accept a 
new source node such that B has not 
accepted NSMAX sources from M yet. 
M forwards the packet back to the 
previous node P so that P can find 
another neighbor instead of M 
M forwards the packet to A 
No 
Such B is found? 
No 
M assigns this source node to B at M’s 
Source-Neighbor Mapping Table and 






We explain how a relay node M assigns source nodes to its neighbor nodes as 
shown in Figure 5.5. Assuming that every source’s data packet is equally important, we 
use the FCFS (First Come First Serve) manner for this source-neighbor assignment 
process. For example, in Figure 5.5, assume that M received the first data packets of its 
eight source nodes in the following order: M, 6, 7, 8, 1, 3, 4, 2, and 5. Then, M assigns 
firstly arrived three source nodes (M, 6, 7) to its best neighbor N1 chosen by its base 
routing algorithm. The next three source nodes (8, 1, 3) and the remaining three source 
nodes (4, 2, 5) are assigned to M’s next best neighbors N2 and N3, respectively. Each 
source-neighbor pairs is stored in M’s SNMT. Whenever M receives a data packet, M 
will forward the packet to its designated neighbor associated with the source of the packet 
by using M’s SNMT. 
 
5.5.3 Simulation Setups and Results Analysis 
We conduct simulations with the commercial network simulator OPNET Modeler 
v.17. One hundred sensors are deployed in a 2km×2km area randomly as shown in Figure 
5.7. Each sensor node except the BS generates a packet randomly in each 10-second 
period. The packets are sent to the BS. We use some of the default settings in OPNET 
such as 1024-bit data packet and Geographic Routing Protocol (GRP) with a maximum 
of seven retransmissions before ACK is received. We set each node’s initial trust value to 
be 0.99. We choose one sensor node near the BS as the selective forwarding DoS attacker 
so that it can receive and drop many data packets throughout the network. The simulation 
time is set to be 60 minutes (=3,600 seconds). The attacker targets various numbers of 
victims. We implement two trust-based routing algorithms: Trust-based GRP based on 
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the beta trust model (Beta GRP) and our prevention routing algorithm combining the 
Beta GRP and our prevention method (Beta GRP-P). For our prevention method, NSMAX is 
set to be 3, because the beta trust model with ΘT = 0.7 is used in simulations. 
 
Table 5.8: OPNET simulation setup parameters 
Parameters Setting 
General 
Terrain dimension 2km × 2km 
Number of nodes 100 
Topology Random 
Max. simulation time 60 mins (3,600 seconds) 
Base routing algorithm GRP 
Max. retransmissions 7 (OPNET default) 
Data packet 
Generation 
Start time – Stop time 100 seconds – end of simulation 
Destination Base station 
Packet arrival interval Every 10 second 
Packet size 1,024 bits 
Trust model 
Type Beta trust model 
Initial trust value 0.99 
Trust threshold (ΘT) 0.7 
Attack model 
Number of attackers Single attacker 





Figure 5.7: A WSN topology in our simulations. One hundred sensors are deployed in a 
2km×2km area randomly 
We use the following performance metrics:  
1) Avoidance completion time (ACT): this is the time when all the victims have 
been re-routed to avoid the attacker. 
2) False alarm rate (FAR): as discussed in the previous section, this is the 
probability that a good node is being considered as a selective forwarding-based DoS 
attacker. 
3) Number of source nodes whose data packets route to the attacker through the 
same monitoring node (NS): By this metric, we can get the theoretical maximum number 
of victims (NVMAX) which the attacker can stealthily target without being noticed by the BS. 
4) Packet delivery rate (PDR): This is the probability that a data packet is 
delivered to the BS. PDR is obtained by the total number of data packets delivered to the 
BS divided by the total number of data packets generated by all source nodes.  
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We first show how many source nodes’ data packets can route through the inside 
attacker (located near the BS) in the simulation network topology. To see routing paths 
from source nodes to the BS via the attacker, we simulate the attacker forwarding packets 
normally toward the BS without attacking any source (attack off).  
Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 show source nodes whose data packets route through 
the attacker and their routing paths to the BS when the Beta GRP and our prevention 
routing algorithm (Beta GRP-P) are used, respectively. We can see that when Beta GRP 
is used, the attacker receives data packets from many more source nodes as compared to 
our approach is used.  
 
Figure 5.8: 30 potential victim source nodes and their routing paths to the BS when Beta GRP 
is used. The circle is the physical area under the selective forwarding-based DoS attack. 
 The area under the selective forwarding- 




Figure 5.9: 8 potential victim source nodes and their routing paths to the BS when our 
prevention routing algorithm (Beta GRP-P) is used. 
 
Table 5.9: The number of source nodes whose data packets route through the attacker (NS) and the 
maximum number of victim source nodes (NVMAX) 
Monitoring node 
Beta GRP Our Beta GRP-P 
NS NVMAX NS NVMAX 
43 2 0 2 0 
70 27 8 3 0 
72 1 0 3 0 
Total 30 8 8 0 
 
Specifically, Table 5.9 shows NS and NVMAX of the Beta GRP and our approach 
(Beta GRP-P). When the Beta GRP is used, the attacker receives 27 source nodes’ data 
packets from node 70. In this case, the attacker can drop up to 8 source nodes’ data 
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packets completely without being detected by node 70’s beta trust model theoretically 
(NVMAX =8). Meanwhile, when our approach is used, the attacker receives at most 3 source 
nodes from node 70 or 72. Consequently, the attacker cannot successfully launch the DoS 
attack against any source node without being detected by node 70 or 72.   
Second, we examine ACT that indicates the ability of each approach in 
identifying the attacker and re-routing the victim’s packets. We simulate the attacker 
launching the selective forwarding-based DoS attack by increasing the number of victims 
(J). We assume that the attacker intentionally targets source nodes from node 70 because 
it can have the largest number of victim source nodes.  
The simulation results on ACT in Table 5.10 reveal the followings:  
1) Beta trust model alone fails to detect the attacker: As shown in Table 5.10, the 
attacker can attack up to 8 sources without being caught by node 70’s beta trust model. 
As shown in Figure 5.8, the entire area monitored by the 8 victims (circled area) can be 
influenced by the DoS attack, and thus outside intruders can stay in or move around the 
area stealthily. 
2) Our approach successfully defends against the attacker: The proposed 
outsider-insider colluding attack is not effective when our prevention approach is used 
because the number of victims is very small. That is, since the attacker cannot target 
more than 3 source nodes when our approach is used, the victim area is significantly 
reduced compared to when the Beta GRP is used. As a result, outside intruders’ 
movement will be limited by the small area monitored by victim nodes. In addition, if the 
attacker insists to attack any victim (the case of J=1), the attacker will be detected by 
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1,296 seconds. This ACT can be reduced to around 540 seconds when our detection 
scheme is used together (see Table 5.4).  
   
 
Table 5.10: Avoidance completion time ACT (in seconds): J: number of victim source nodes 
 
J Beta GRP Our Beta GRP-P 
1 Fail 1,296 
2 Fail 360 









Third, FAR measures the likelihood an approach will mistakenly treat an honest node 
as attacker. Both approaches have almost similar FARs that range from 0.03 to 0.04. Thus, 
we consider our approach does not increase FAR compared with the Beta GRP.    
Finally, we report PDR. We show results when the number of victims (J) is less 
than 4 for comparison purposes. As shown in Table 5.11, our approach has a higher 
packet delivery performance than the Beta GRP. This is because our approach can detect 
and avoid the attacker while the Beta GRP cannot defend against the attacker.  
 




Beta GRP  Our Beta GRP-P 
1 0.910 0.946 
2 0.901 0.957 
3 0.893 0.945 
 138 
 
5.6 Summary  
In this chapter, we first present a simple selective forwarding-based DoS attack, 
and show that two representative trust mechanisms (namely the beta trust model and the 
entropy trust model) fail to detect such attack. We also show the potential damage this 
attack could cause to the network. Second, we propose a source-level trust evaluation 
scheme to enhance the beta and entropy trust mechanisms to effectively detect the 
selective forwarding-based DoS attack. In addition, we propose two avoidance strategies 
to re-route the victim’s packets so they can reach the BS, and validate our claims and 
evaluate the performance of our detection and avoidance mechanisms with extensive 
OPNET simulations.  
Finally, we introduce a prevention routing algorithm to proactively prevent the 
selective forwarding-based DoS attack as a complementary defensive mechanism to our 
detection and avoidance methods. The preliminary simulation results show that the beta 
trust model with our prevention method successfully defends against a selective 
forwarding-based DoS attacker while the beta trust model fails in detecting the attacker. 
There are also several directions for future work. First, how to further reduce 
ACT to minimize the attacker’s damage to the network. Second, our preliminary results 
on network with lossy network show fairly large FAR. How to improve the accuracy of 
the proposed approach in such network is still a challenge.  Finally, after the inside 
attackers become aware of our defensive mechanism, how they can respond to the 
challenge and launch more sophisticated attacks.  
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion  
 
In this dissertation, we analyze the limitation of the state-of-the-art trust 
mechanisms and propose several enhancement techniques to better defend against insider 
packet drop attacks in WSNs. The main contributions can be summarized as follows:  
First, we demonstrate that the phenomenon of consecutive packet drops is one 
fundamental difference between attackers and good sensor nodes and build a hybrid 
trust model based on this observation to improve the detection speed and accuracy of 
current trust models. In Chapter 3, we design a lightweight trust model based on the 
concept of consecutive drops, and build a hybrid trust model that can adaptively choose 
between this new trust model and the existing beta trust model according to the number 
of consecutive drops. When a node is dropping packets consecutively, our new trust 
model will penalize the node based on the number of consecutive drops so the node’s 
trust value will decrease fast. Extensive simulations on the OPNET Wireless Modeler 
show that our hybrid trust model outperforms the beta trust model in terms of important 
network performance parameters such as attack detection speed and attack detection 
accuracy. The results show that our hybrid trust model can always detect various inside 
packet drop attackers faster than the beta trust model. In addition, our hybrid trust model 
triggers false alarms on bad links due to collision, congestion, etc. and reduces natural 
packet drops by avoiding such links. A geographic routing protocol (GRP) with our 
hybrid trust model (Hybrid GRP) can deliver approximately 92% of data packets 
successfully even when 15% of the nodes in the network are grayhole attackers that 
 140 
 
randomly drop 30% of packets. As a comparison, the pure GRP and GRP with the beta 
trust model (Beta GRP) can deliver only 71% and 78% of packets, respectively. 
Moreover, our Hybrid GRP consumes less energy to send a packet than the pure GRP and 
the Beta GRP. 
Second, we devise a false alarm detection and recovery mechanism (FADER) 
that continues evaluating the trustworthiness of a node even when the node’s trust 
value falls below the trust threshold (which will be considered as attacker by the 
current trust models) in order to determine whether the node is an attacker or a falsely 
detected good node. As described in Chapter 4, our main idea to treat false alarms in a 
trust-based routing is to give these nodes a second chance such that their neighbors can 
continue to monitor their behavior and evaluate their trustworthiness. By doing so, we 
can detect the false alarms and reuse the good nodes that have been mistakenly 
considered as attackers. This will enable us to improve the performance of the trust-based 
routing protocol in terms of many metrics such as the network lifetime, the packet 
delivery rate, and many routing performance measures. We have conducted extensive 
OPNET simulations and the results confirm these claimed advantages of our proposed 
FADER approach over a representative trust-based routing algorithm. The results show 
that FADER is able to recover 60−70% of the false alarms without mis-identifying any of 
the attackers as good nodes. In addition, with the false alarm detection and recovery 
feature, FADER can improve the network lifetime by 18.7−82.9% of Beta GRP and 
reduce the average hops per path by 7.5−16.7%. 
Third, we demonstrate how intelligent inside packet drop attackers can 
successfully launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against many sensor nodes without 
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being detected by current trust models and propose effective detection and prevention 
methods against such attack, which we refer to as selective forwarding-based DoS 
attack. In Chapter 5, we first describe a simple selective forwarding-based DoS attack 
and show that the popular trust-based approaches (such as the beta trust model and the 
entropy trust model) for inside attacker detection fail to detect such attack. We also 
analyze the potential damage this attack can cause to the network. We then propose a 
source-level trust evaluation scheme to enhance the beta and entropy trust mechanisms 
for effective detection of the selective forwarding-based DoS attackers. Once the attacker 
is identified, we propose two avoidance strategies to re-route the victim’s packets so they 
can be delivered successfully. As a complementary defensive mechanism to this detection 
and avoidance approach, we also introduce a prevention routing algorithm to proactively 
prevent the selective forwarding-based DoS attacks. The key idea of our prevention 
method is that each monitoring node will only forward packets from a limited number of 
source nodes to the next node. As a result, the next node will be forced to make a choice 
between “not attacking” or “attacking and being caught”. In addition to a theoretical 
analysis of this approach, we also conduct extensive OPNET simulations to validate our 




Future Work  
 
Trust-based defense against insider packet drop attacks is a relatively new and 
very active research area. This dissertation contributes to this topic with several 
enhancements to existing trust-based mechanisms. Before we describe the immediate 
future work to improve and extend our research in Chapter 3 – 5, we discuss two major 
directions. 
First, one of the characteristics that make insider packet drop attacks unique is the 
fact that inside attackers know the defensive mechanisms used in the network and 
therefore may adjust their attacking strategies accordingly. Although this is out of the 
scope of this dissertation, it will be interesting to study how intelligent inside attackers 
can break our proposed defending mechanism enhancements. The selective forward-
based DoS attack we discussed in Chapter 5 is one example of insider-outsider colluding 
attacks. Another example is the case when the attacker does not have to drop a large 
number of consecutive packets to create the damage. In such scenario, an intelligent 
inside attacker can easily defeat our new trust model based on consecutive packet drops 
(Chapter 3). Also, an attacker can take advantage of the FADER approach in Chapter 4 
and launch a mixed on-off and grayhole attack where the attacker will stop dropping 
packers when it becomes suspicious to the monitoring node and resume the attack when 
its trust value increases. This is the game that good guys and bad guys play in all security 
problems and it is this game that advances the arts of attacking schemes and defending 
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countermeasures (as we have discussed in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). Not coincidently, 
there are many recent game theoretical approaches to study this problem.    
 Second, for most of the study in this dissertation, we use the simple Beta trust 
model for simplicity to demonstrate how the current trust-based defending mechanisms 
can be improved with our proposed approaches and perform extensive simulation to 
validate our claims. Conceptually, the notion of consecutive packet drops, false alarm 
recovery, and source-level monitoring can all be integrated to other sophisticated trust 
models. As one can imagine, these models have better performance than the Beta trust 
model and therefore there will be less room for our enhancement techniques to gain 
further improvement. However, improving the detection accuracy, for instance, from 
95% to 98%, is probably more challenging and more important (at least from the point of 
view of science) than improving it from 50% to 75%. It will be interesting to study some 
of the latest trust models and see how much our new techniques can help. Meanwhile, 
despite the fact that we do have several pieces of theoretical results, the lack of a 
mathematically sound foundation remains as a weakness for this dissertation. Empirical 
study has its value, but one theorem speaks more than one thousand experiments. It will 
be crucial to conduct theoretical study on the propose techniques to analyze their impact 
on the trust-based defensive mechanisms.   
 The next three paragraphs highlight some of the potential follow-up research for 
each of the enhancement techniques we have proposed in this dissertation.  
 In Chapter 3, we have introduced the concept of consecutive packet drops as a 
feature that can be used to distinguish packet drops by the inside attackers and caused by 
network problems. The intention is to argue that to further improve the detection speed 
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and accuracy of any trust-based mechanisms, it is necessary to include metrics (such as 
consecutive packet drops) that can differentiate attackers and good nodes. In the long 
term, we will continue to study the behaviors of inside attackers in order to develop such 
new metrics. Some immediate follow-up works of Chapter 3 include: (1) how to deal 
with the false alarms due to the large penalty to consecutive drops, particularly when the 
communication channel is lossy. (2) how to integrate the trust model on consecutive 
drops with models other than the Beta trust model, where the main difficulty is that there 
is no analytic solution for the model transition.  
 In Chapter 4, we have developed FADER to detect and recover the false alarms in 
trust-based defensive mechanisms. This work is motivated by the increasing amount of 
false alarms during our pursuit of fast and accurate inside attacker detection. We observe 
such phenomenon when we implement consecutive packet drop based trust model and we 
believe that this will happen for other approaches as well. The main goal of FADER (or 
false alarm recovery) is to accurately identify the false alarms and recover them as fast as 
possible. It is interesting that as a side effect, we are able to improve network lifetime and 
routing performance. The future work on this topic includes: (1) analyzing the impact of 
FADER on network lifetime and routing in order to obtain quantitative prediction on how 
much FADER can help. (2) investigating on how inside attackers may take advantage of 
FADER to disguise themselves as good nodes and providing countermeasures. (3) 
improving FADER’s recovery ability (from the current 70% false alarm recover rate). 
 In Chapter 5, we have described an intelligent attack that can survive from the 
existing trust mechanisms and proposed new features to the trust-based method to defend 
such attack. This is an example showing the game between the attacker and defender, 
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where inside attackers explore the vulnerabilities of the trust methods and launch new 
attacks without being detected and defenders come up with new countermeasures to 
identify these new attacks.  Future work along this direction includes: (1) how to further 
reduce the avoidance completion time in order to minimize the damage that the attackers 
can make to the network. (2) what other limitations in the current trust-based approaches 
and our enhancement techniques that can be utilized by the attackers to launch new 
attacks, particularly in the case when there are multiple collaborative attackers.       
 Finally, we will study how to build an integrated trust-based defense mechanism 
that combines all the defensive method enhancements proposed in this dissertation in the 
OPNET simulator. This simulation platform will be very useful for analyzing the 
intelligent attacker’s behavior against our defense mechanisms and for validating the 
performance of any future follow-up works, especially in a large-scale WSN. 






Build an integrated defensive mechanism in OPNET Simulator
Proposed works in this dissertation
Future work
Build the integrated 










Figure 7.1: The big picture of our future work. 
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Appendix A  
More In-depth Comparison between Hybrid GRP and Beta GRP  
 
In this appendix, we report the performance of our hybrid trust model and the 
Beta trust model with various trust threshold values. This is in response to the following 
question raised by the committee members during the oral dissertation defense: with the 
same trust threshold value, hybrid GRP has a much shorter detection completion time 
(DCT) than Beta GRP at the cost of a higher false alarm rate (FAR). If Beta GRP is 
allowed to create the same FAR by using a higher trust threshold value, what will be its 
DCT?  
First, we thank the committee members for this very insightful question and many 
other valuable comments. To answer this question, we have performed more simulation 
with various trust threshold values because it is hard to control FAR. More specifically, 
we use the following seven different threshold (TH) values: 0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 
0.85, and 0.90 with the same OPNET simulation setups used in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.3. 
We deploy, near the base station, one grayhole attacker that drops 60% of packets (attack 
rate = 60%). For each threshold value, we run 10 simulations with 10 different random 
seeds, each simulation has a duration of three hours (10,800 seconds), and we report the 
average results of the 10 simulations. 
We compare the performance of the two trust-based routing algorithms (Beta 
GRP and Hybrid GRP) along the following performance metrics: 
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1) Detection Completion Time (DCT): DCT is defined as the simulation time 
(seconds) when all attackers are detected by all the victim nodes whose packets are dropped 
by the attackers. DCT measures how quickly a trust model detects attackers. 
2) Packet Delivery Rate (PDR): PDR is the probability that a data packet is 
successfully delivered to the base station (BS). A reliable trust-based routing will deliver 
most of the data packets to the BS even with the presence of inside packet drop attackers. 
We use PDR to evaluate the reliability of a trust-based routing algorithm. 
3) False Alarm Rate (FAR): We adopt the definition of FAR from [23] where a false 
detection occurs when a node claims a non-attack as an attack. The FAR is the number of 
false detections divided by the number of normal nodes as defined in [23]. 
 
Table A.1: Performance metrics given various threshold values (attack rate = 60%) 
Threshold TH 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 
DCT 
Beta 1998 1382.4 1058.4 777.6 496.8 324 205.2 
HYBD 378 334.8 280.8 259.2 226.8 151.2 118.8 
NA 
Beta 547 387.7 280.3 200.7 139.7 92.7 55.8 
HYBD 95.1 86.6 70.1 60.2 49.4 37.9 29 
NNA (t = DCT) 
Beta 848.7 617.8 474.1 352.2 231.4 154.3 108.9 
HYBD 538.8 422.5 330.8 250.8 171.5 120.4 84.7 
PDR 
Beta 0.926 0.935 0.946 0.955 0.961 0.970 0.977 
HYBD 0.959 0.960 0.963 0.966 0.971 0.976 0.980 
FAR 
Beta 0.106 0.114 0.125 0.129 0.154 0.208 0.225 
HYBD 0.127 0.129 0.145 0.156 0.195 0.222 0.231 
NT, BETA (t = DCT) 9673.9 6712 5144.9 3800.7 2443 1612.5 1046.8 
NT, BETA (t = 3 hours) 51404.4 51429.8 51434.2 51378.1 51394.3 51400.5 51394.8 
NNA, BETA (t = 3 hours) 3218.2 2930.7 2468.4 2091.3 1825.2 1446 1090.4 
NPDR (%) 5.68 5.17 4.31 3.66 3.26 2.59 1.95 
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The simulation results shown in Table A.1 and Figure A.1 reveal the followings: 
First, as the threshold TH increases, DCT decreases because a trust model can 
detect the attacker quicker with a high TH. However, FAR increases because good nodes 
are more likely to be falsely detected as attackers when the trust threshold is high. In 
addition, PDR increases and becomes close to one because of the reduced DCT, the time 
when all the attackers are identified. After that, there will not be any packet drops due to 
attacking and network problems will be the only cause of packet drop. Our Hybrid GRP 
has higher FAR than Beta GRP because our Hybrid GRP considers consecutive drops 
and gives large penalty for them. However, for the same reason, our Hybrid GRP has 
smaller DCT and higher PDR than the Beta GRP.  
Second, we provide answer to the committee’s question. In order to get the same 
FAR, the beta trust model can use a higher threshold than our hybrid trust model. This 
improves DCT of the beta trust model, but it is still higher than our hybrid trust model. 
For example, when we set FAR = 0.129 (the red dotted horizontal line in Figure A.1), our 
hybrid trust model can use TH=0.65 and the beta trust model can afford to use TH = 0.75. 
When we draw the two red dotted vertical lines (in Figure A.1) from these two values, we 
see that the DCT of beta trust model (777.6s from Table A.1) is much higher than the 
DCT value (334.8s) of our model. This indicates that under FAR constraint, our hybrid 
model will still complete the attacker detection faster.  
Third, it is not surprising to see that as the threshold TH increases, the number of 
packets dropped due to attacks (NA) reduces because a trust model with a higher trust 
threshold can detect the attacker faster than a trust model with a lower trust threshold. In 
addition, as the threshold TH increases, the number of packets dropped due to non-
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attacks (NNA) decreases. This is because normal nodes in bad links (due to fading, 
congestion, etc) are detected as attackers by trust models since they drop many packets. 
Although these nodes are considered as false alarms in the insider attack detection 
problem, PDR can be improved by avoiding these problematic false alarm nodes, which 
indeed behave just like insider attacks.   
 
 
Figure A.1: DCT (left Y-axis), PDR and FAR (right Y-axis) for Hybrid GRP and Beta GRP 
with different trust threshold values (X-axis) when attacking rate is 60%. 
 
Finally, we conduct further investigation in an attempt to explain how the OPNET 
simulator simulates natural packet drops caused by collision, fading, congestion, etc. after 
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we fail to obtain such information from the OPNET documentation. The last row in Table 
A.1 reports the natural packet drop rate (NPDR %), which is defined as the number of 
packet drops after DCT (these drops will be all natural packet drops as the attackers have 
been detected and packets are re-routed to avoid the attackers) divided by the number of 












NANA  (A.1) 
For example, when TH = 0.6, the average (over the 10 simulations) number of packets 
generated after DCT is 41,730.5 and the average number of packets dropped by non-
attackers after DCT is 2369.5. Thus, NPDR is approximately 5.68% 
(=100×2369.5/41730.5). That is, 5.68% of packets generated are dropped naturally 
regardless of the attacker in this simulation setup in the OPNET simulator. As the 
threshold TH increases, NPDR decreases because good nodes with poor communication 
link will be misclassified by trust models as attackers after they drop many packets. 
Therefore, after DCT, they will not be included in the network and cannot cause more 
packet drops. In another word, with a high TH value, the network will experience less 
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